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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Tenure is the right for teachers to qualify for 
continued employment free from unlawful, arbitrary, and 
capricious dismissal by a school board. Dismissal of tenured 
teachers can only be initiated upon cause by the board of 
education, and must provide the teacher with an opportunity 
for due process procedures. As it is conferred by legislative 
action, it is only applicable to public school teachers. 
Historically, the concept of teacher's tenure dates back 
in the United States to the 1880s with the inception of the 
civil service plan under the administration of President 
Andrew Jackson. Civil service was developed as a result of 
national criticism to the "spoils system" that had come into 
prominence during that era. On January 16, 1883, the first 
civil service act was passed as "An act to regulate and 
improve the civil service of the United States," (22 Stat. 
403). 
In 1885, the matter of tenure of school officials was 
brought forth as a proposal by the National Education 
Association. The tenure sought was a form of civil service 
1 
2 
for the teaching profession. The National Education 
Association concluded 
that tenure for public school teachers would be for the 
good of the schools and the general public, and that it 
would protect the profession from personal or political 
influence and be made free from the malignant power of 
spoils and patronage. 1 
Tenure developed rapidly following the civil service 
plan of 1883. The first statewide tenure law was enacted in 
New Jersey in 1909. Nationally, the basic objectives of the 
different plans that followed were to protect teachers against 
unjust removal after having undergone an adequate probationary 
period by: eliminating arbitrary intent for demotion or 
termination of position; minimizing malicious or capricious 
acts; and setting aside political or partisan trends. It was 
also thought that with the added guarantees, the profession 
would attract and retain quality teachers. 2 
Between 1935 and 1940 an astounding amount of 
legislative activity occurred. The National Education 
Association (N.E.A.) reported that 
23 percent of the teachers in the United States were 
covered under tenure legislation in 1936. In 1938, 
twenty-one states had one or more tenure bills presented 
to the legislature. New tenure laws of varying importance 
were enacted in ten states. Legislation covered 
approximately 37 percent of all teachers in the U.S., an 
1A narration of the history and purpose of tenure 
provided in Mcsherry v. City of St. Paul, 202 Minn. 102, 277 
N.W. 541 (1938). 
2Ibid. 
I 
3 
increase of 14 percent over a two-year period. 3 
By 1947, 42.6 percent of teachers in the United States were 
under tenure, 3 2 • 5 percent were under continuing contract 
laws, 8.4 percent were under laws permitting long-term 
contracts, 2.3 percent were under laws requiring annual 
contracts and 11.2 percent were without an legislature 
protection. 4 
Although tenure legislation developed rapidly, it did 
not do so without controversy. Teacher associations viewed 
tenure as "the teachers' Bill of Rights. 115 The associations 
felt that 
although some districts employed fair and orderly 
procedures in dismissal, many did not afford teachers the 
same rights as a criminal on trial for his life-a hearing 
as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Anything less than 
dismissal for good and just cause established beyond doubt 
by fair and just means, was a denial of democracy. 6 
George D. Strayer, a proponent of teacher tenure, 
studied the operation of tenure law in Chicago in 1932. His 
conclusions regarding the "case for tenure" were expressed in 
The Administration of Schools as follows: 
1. It conforms to an increasing social concern for the 
economic security of all works. 
3oonald Dushane, "The status of Tenure Legislation," 
Journal of the National Education Association (May 1938) : 155. 
4committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom-National 
Education Association, Teacher Tenure: Analysis and Appraisal, 
Washington, D.C., 1947, p. 10. 
511sneak Attack on Education," The Clearing House, (April 
1943): 540. 
6Ibid. 
4 
2. Security of tenure tends to remove personal, 
political, and other unprofessional pressures from 
teachers. 
3. It places the emphasis of personnel practice on 
improved methods of selection of teachers at entrance to 
training as well as at the time of appointment. 
4. It emphasizes good supervisory practices, placing a 
premium on leadership rather than on coercive methods. 
5. It does not materially increase the difficulty of 
removing the unprofessional teacher after a certain 
length of service. A teacher should be removed from 
service for insubordination, incompetency, and 
unprofessional conduct. 7 
According to the 1943 American School Board Journal, not 
everyone viewed tenure favorably, e.g., most notably school 
boards and administrators. It was feared that tenure 
protection would prevent the dismissal of the incompetent 
teacher, making the position of the permanent teacher 
impregnable. 8 
At a panel discussion sponsored by the Lake Shore 
Division of the Illinois Education Association in 1940, Dr. 
E.H. Hanson, superintendent of schools at Rock Island, 
presented the following points in defense of not implementing 
tenure: 
1. The people, through their boards of education, 
should formulate and establish school policies. Would 
tenure in practice nullify school policies? Could 
tenure legislation be drawn in a manner such that the 
competent teacher can gain protection, yet boards of 
education would not relinquish control? 
2. The school system should insure that teachers will 
grow professionally in order to preserve democracy and 
7George D. Strayer, The Administration of Schools, 1932 
in Eloise P. Bingham, "Teachers Professional Problems !!-
Continuing Tenure," The Illinois Teacher (April 1940): 540. 
811 courts and Teacher Tenure," American School Board 
Journal (October 1943): 47. 
5 
the best welfare of the children. Would the threat of 
discharge be needed to force teacher growth? 
3. A school system should operate on sound business 
principles. Does tenure legislation render impossible 
any necessary retrenchment program?9 
The debate on tenure has continued. over the years it 
has been discussed relative to collective bargaining and most 
recently to implementation of school reform. 
Tenure controversy also spilled into the courtroom. As 
states adopted tenure laws, more often than not courts were 
called upon to interpret dismissal decisions based statutory 
tenure regulations. In early dismissal cases, judges 
frequently determined whether a teacher was tenured or still 
within the probationary period. Decisions pointed toward a 
necessity for fairness on the part of the school boards with 
their staffs. 
In one such case regarding fairness, Langan v. School 
District of the city of Pittson, Pennsylvania in 1939, a 
teacher was voted as tenured by a bare majority of the board 
of education. Two months later new members were elected. The 
new board without notice to the teacher, by resolution 
declared her contract void. Because her contract was void, 
the board of education reasoned that no rights are to be 
conferred by a void instrument. The teacher felt that she was 
within the tenure act and took her case to court. The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania ruled that: 
911Teacher Tenure Legislation, " American School Board 
Journal (December 1940): 32. 
6 
if all that were required to void a teacher's contract 
were a mere statement by the new board that the teacher 
was not necessary at the time of her appointment, then the 
safeguards of the tenure act would be valueless .•• 10 
Recent court decisions have placed the meaning of 
teacher's tenure under a federal constitutional overlay of 
substantive and procedural due process as guaranteed by the 
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Between 
1972 and 1976 courts (federal and state) consistently applied 
the U.S. Supreme Courts holdings. Two federal supreme court 
cases, Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann added 
another dimension. Prior to those decisions, boards and 
administrators had only to remain within the limitations of 
state statutes. With additional guidelines, personnel 
decisions now were to be free from constitutional violations. 
Taken together these cases balanced school board prerogatives, 
with teacher constitutional rights. 11 
Often a probationary or nontenure teacher may have 
asserted a property right when dismissed prior to the end of 
a contract, but in general it is acknowledged that no property 
interest existed beyond the end of a contract. 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study was twofold. First, it sought 
to examine and narrate the development of Illinois teacher 
10Langan v. School District of City of Pittson, 6 A. 2d 772 
(1939). 
11 Board of Regents v. Roth, et al., 92 s. ct. (1972), 408 
U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed.2d 548 (1972); Perry et al., Sindermann, 
etc., 408 U.S. 593, 33 L.E.2d 570 (1972). 
7 
employment statutes; and second, to analyze the dismissal of 
tenured elementary and secondary teachers in public school 
districts throughout the state. Of the two issues which were 
studied, the focal point was dismissal for cause of tenured 
public school teachers between 1941 and 1989. In order to 
have deduced conclusions regarding teacher dismissal, the 
implications and effects of teacher employment legislation 
upon dismissal needed to be addressed. Further, in presenting 
a thorough analysis and fostering a clear understanding of 
current teacher dismissal practices, a detailed legal 
background of employment provisions were provided pre-dating 
tenure law to the year 1900. 
It was a further purpose to establish an overview of 
tenure law and court cases for future use by educators, school 
board members, and researchers. This overview could act as a 
tool which would assist in the formulation of district 
employment policies and guidelines or serve as a basis for 
additional research. 
Organization of the study 
Both issues in this study, tenure and dismissal of 
tenured teachers, were legally based. Tenure itself was 
legislatively enacted in the Illinois Revised Statutes in 
1941. Procedures for teacher dismissal, including a judicial 
review of administrative decisions of termination of 
employment, were amended into the revised statutes under 
tenure. Causes for dismissal were also listed in the Illinois 
8 
Revised Statutes, although in a separate section. Therefore, 
the primary source of documents to be analyzed were the 
Illinois Revised Statutes and Illinois court cases pertaining 
to teacher dismissal at the appellate and supreme court levels 
between 1900 and 1989. Federal court cases were also reviewed 
when the claims brought by teachers were believed to be a 
violation of the United States Cons ti tut ion. Secondary 
sources of information were also utilized and included 
dissertations and articles with respect to tenure and teacher 
dismissal. 
Through the use of content analysis of primary and 
secondary sources, this study endeavored to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. What was the legal statutory law history for 
dismissal of tenured teachers in elementary and 
secondary public schools of Illinois? 
2. What was the legal case law history for dismissal 
of tenured teachers in elementary and secondary 
public schools of Illinois? 
3. What were the trends and issues for dismissal of 
tenured teachers in elementary and secondary public 
schools of Illinois? 
As Illinois courts did not allude to the political and 
social aspects of tenure these concepts in case commentary, 
were not included as research questions. Therefore, it was 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve into the 
9 
political and social aspects of this country during the 
development of teacher tenure in Illinois. 
In answering these research questions, secondary sources 
such as dissertations and articles from educational 
periodicals and law reviews were first surveyed to obtain a 
general background of knowledge. This information was found 
through employing an Eric search and using Education Index and 
west's Illinois Digest. 
Primary sources, which were Illinois teacher employment 
statutes and judicial cases from local and federal courts, 
were then researched for information more specifically 
relating to the topics of study. All court case citations 
were located in local and federal law indices. Only court 
cases which dealt with dismissal of elementary or secondary 
tenure teachers for cause as specified in SEC. 10-22.4 were 
selected. This section stated that teachers could be 
dismissed by a board of education for: 
Incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality, or other 
sufficient cause, . failing to complete a one-year 
remediation plan with a "satisfactory" or better rating, 
and whenever, in its opinion, he is not qualified to 
teach, or whenever, in its opinion, the interests of the 
schools require its. . . 12 
In order to answer the research questions posed, 
statutes and court cases were sectioned into time periods 
historically significant to teacher employment legislation. 
Within each time period statutes and case law were examined 
12ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 10-22.4 (1988). 
separating Chicago from downstate school districts. 
10 
These 
districts were not intermixed as Chicago was governed by 
different state statute, than those school districts in the 
rest of the state. 
Once the statutes and court cases were grouped according 
to a designated time period, the conclusions of the study were 
developed by analyzing the following variables: 
1. Criteria for dismissing tenured teachers identified 
in the Illinois Revised Statutes from 1941 to 1989. 
2. Types of teacher dismissal cases heard by Illinois 
courts between 1900 and 1989. 
3. Grounds for dismissal cited by the school board. 
4. Allegations, behaviors, and actions cited by the 
school board to establish grounds for dismissal. 
5. Issues brought forward by the dismissed tenured 
teacher in appealing the school board's dismissal 
decision. 
6. Rationale given by the Illinois courts for 
reversals or affirmations of public school board 
decisions. 
7. Major elements that influenced changes in dismissal 
law for tenured teachers in Illinois public 
schools. 
Definition of Terms 
The following legal terms were defined to facilitate 
clarity and understanding when used in the investigation of 
11 
this study. Definitions were taken from Barron's Law 
Dictionary13 unless otherwise indicated. 
Adjudicate: The determination of a controversy and a 
pronouncement of a judgment based on evidence presented. 
Affirm: The assertion of a higher court that the 
judgment of the court below is correct and should stand. 
Amend: The alteration of an established law. 
Appeal: A resort to a higher court for the purpose of 
obtaining a review of a lower court decision and a reversal of 
the lower court's judgment or the granting of a new trial. 
Appellant: The party who appeals a decision and brings 
the proceeding to a reviewing court. (This party may also be 
referred to as the challenger, appealer, or contender.) 
Board: Board of directors, board of education, or board 
of school inspectors. 14 
Cause: Teacher dismissal reasons from employment as 
specified in state tenure law. (The responsibility for 
substantiating cause rested with the initiating school board. 
In the Illinois Revised Statutes, cause was defined as 
incompetency, cruelty, negligence, and immorality. It further 
empowered a board of education to dismiss a teacher for "other 
sufficient cause", whenever, in the opinion of the board, "the 
interests of the schools required it, " or whenever, in the 
13steven H. Gifis, Barron's Law Dictionary (New York: 
Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1984). 
14ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-10 (1988). 
12 
opinion of the board, the teacher was "not qualified to 
teach." Temporary mental or physical incapacity to perform 
teaching duties or marriage were not a cause for dismissal. 15 
Charges: Specific acts or incidents which establish or 
support one or more of the causes for dismissal. 16 
Dismissal: Termination of the teacher's services for 
cause by action of the school board prior to the lawful 
expiration of the contract. 17 
Liberty Interest: An infringement by a school board or 
administrative action which imposes a stigma or other 
disability that forecloses the teacher's freedom to take 
advantage of other employment opportunities or otherwise 
injured that employee's good name or reputation in the 
community. 18 
Plaintiff: The party who initially brings the suit or 
seeks remedy in a court of law. (This party may also be 
referred to as complainant, accuser, claimant, or litigant. 
Probationary Service: A trial period of employment 
served by teachers before being eligible for tenure. (It was 
required of teachers in Illinois school districts outside of 
15 d I . , Sec. 10-22. 4 ( 1988) . 
16Gerard E. Dempsey, Formal Dismissal and Suspension 
Procedures Under Illinois Tenure Law (Chicago, Illinois: 
Institute for Continuing Legal Education, 1985), 13.22 
17Nancy Sindelar, "Issues and Outcomes of Federal Court 
Cases Involving Teachers Dismissed for Incompetent Behavior: 
1900 to 1986" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Loyola University, 1986). 
18 MINN. STAT. ANN., 1984. 
13 
Chicago, to serve two years of probationary service, before 
qualifying for contractual continued service. Teachers of 
Chicago must have served three years before the conferment of 
a permanent appointment. ) 19 
Procedural Rights: "Due process" rights that safeguard 
the protection of an individual's substantive rights. To 
compel due process protection, the teacher must show that a 
sufficient "property" or "1 iberty" interest was present. 20 
Property Interest: A legitimate claim of entitlement to 
continued employment. (In terms of teacher tenure.) 
Statutory Law: An act of the legislature, adopted 
pursuant to its constitutional authority. 
Substantive Rights: Rights that are guaranteed by the 
U.S. and state constitutions to "liberty" and to "property", 
and those constitutionally valid statutory rights granted by 
the Legislature. 21 
Teacher: Any or all school district employees regularly 
required to be certified under laws relating to the 
certification of teachers.~ 
Tenure: The right for a teacher to be eligible for 
continued employment free from unlawful, arbitrary, and 
capricious dismissal by a school board. (In Illinois, tenure 
19ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 24-10 and 34-84 (1988). 
20 MINN. STAT. ANN., 1984. 
21Id. 
22ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-10 ( 1988) . 
14 
in school districts outside of Chicago is referred to as 
contractual continued employment; while in Chicago it is 
called a permanent appointment. ) 23 
Writ of Certiorari: A common law writ, issued from a 
superior court to one of inferior jurisdiction, commanding the 
latter to certify and return to the former the record in the 
particular case. {The writ is issued in order that the court 
issuing it may inspect the proceedings and determine whether 
there has been any irregularities. 
Writ of Mandamus: A writ issued from a court to an 
official compelling performance of a ministerial act that the 
law recognizes as an absolute duty, as distinct from other 
types of acts that may be a matter of the official's 
discretion. {It is used only when all other judicial remedies 
have failed or were inadequate.) 
nld. at secs. 24-10 and 34-84 {1988). 
CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TENURE IN ILLINOIS 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to overview teacher tenure laws and 
other teacher employment legislation in Illinois from 1909 to 
1989. In doing so, dismissal procedures that generated from 
tenure law will be emphasized. Chapters thereafter will 
analyze legislation from the Illinois Revised Statutes 
pertaining to dismissal of tenured teachers and accompanying 
case law from the state and federal levels in a chronological 
fashion. 
Early History of Tenure in Illinois: 1917-1941 
The concept of tenure is not new to Illinois. Teachers 
and principals of Chicago have been provided with a type of 
tenure status since 1917, that has provided permanent 
appointment by merit upon fulfilling three years of 
satisfactory probationary service. 1 The permanency of the 
appointment has been subject to the rules of the board of 
education for conduct and efficiency and subject to removal 
for cause by the members of the board of Education. 2 At this 
1ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 138 (1917). 
2Id. at sec. 161 (1917). 
15 
16 
same time however, teachers in Illinois downstate districts 
have not been provided with any type of rights associated with 
tenure. It has been within the powers and duties of the 
boards of these districts to dismiss teachers. 
In districts with one thousand to one hundred thousand 
inhabitants, the boards of education could "dismiss and remove 
a teacher, whenever in their opinion he was not qualified to 
teach, or whenever in their opinion the interests of the 
school require it. 113 School districts with under one thousand 
inhabitants, were governed by school directors. Statutorily, 
they also had the right to "dismiss a teacher for 
incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality or other 
sufficient cause."4 
Although state statute specified that dismissal be based 
on some type of cause in the early 1900s, no district of any 
type mandated that any form of due process be given to the 
teacher before termination of employment. Prior to the 
enactment of tenure law, Illinois courts at various levels of 
the judicial system issued rulings to reaffirm the guidelines 
of the state statute and prohibited the removal or dismissal 
of teachers during the period of their annual contracts unless 
boards could prove cause. 
In one such case, the Illinois Supreme Court held in 
Hartmann v. the Board of Education of Westville Township High 
3Id. at Sec. 127a (1917). 
4Id. at Sec. 115 (1917). 
17 
school District No. 220, 5 that boards of education had the 
power to dismiss teachers during the course of their contracts 
for cause only. The power of dismissal or removal "was not 
intended to bestow upon ..• [boards of education] arbitrary 
power to dismiss without cause, and without specifying any 
reason for such dismissal. 116 Other cases followed Hartmann7 
in the 1930s, but did not produce any change in the teacher 
dismissal process. Concurrently, there was no new legislation 
enacted which would allow for any type of protection of a 
teaching position. 
It was not until July 1, 1941 in the Sixty-second 
General Assembly, that the legislature followed Chicago's lead 
and established law while afforded teachers greater employment 
security for downstate school districts. Section 136b of the 
Illinois Revised Statutes was created for districts with a 
board of directors and less than one thousand inhabitants, 
which SEC. 136c applied to districts with a board of education 
and with more than one thousand but less than five hundred 
thousand inhabitants. 8 Chicago was excluded from both of 
these provisions and remained covered under SEC. 161. 
Section 136b provided terms of employment whereby 
5Hartmann v. Board of Education of Westville Township 
Hiqh School District No. 220, 356 Ill., 577, 191 N.E. 279 
(1934). 
6Id. 
7Id. 
8ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 136b and 136c (1941). 
18 
teachers, principals, and superintendents would be eligible 
for a contract of not more than a three year time period, 
after having fulfilled two years of consecutive probationary 
service in a district. This section further stipulated that 
all employees were 
to be notified not later than March 15 of the year in 
which any regular employment contract expires, whether he 
is to be reemployed • • • If the teacher is not to be re-
employed, he must be given reasons in writing. 9 
Section 136c's provisions differed somewhat. Whereas 
teachers in smaller districts with board of directors were 
delegated eligibility for continuing contracts; teachers in 
larger districts with board of education and school inspectors 
and covered under SEC. 136c, could gain tenure or contractual 
continued service. The four most critical elements of tenure 
as outlined in SEC. 136c were: 1) the probationary period; 2) 
causes for dismissal; 3) the right to a hearing; and 4) the 
right to an appea1. 10 
1) The Probationary Period 
After two years of probation, at least one of which had 
to be after July 1, 1941, teachers were placed on contractual 
continued service until the age of sixty-five, unless they 
were given the notice of dismissal with reasons at least sixty 
days before the end of such probationary period. The 
probationary period could have been extended to three years 
9Id. at Sec. 136b (1941). 
10rd. at Sec. 136c (1941). 
19 
for teachers who had no previous teaching experience. 11 
2) causes for Dismissal of Tenured Teachers 
Causes for dismissal were those that were mentioned in 
SECS. 115 and 127 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. Section 
115 named specifically incompetency, cruelty, negligence, 
immorality, or other sufficient cause. 12 
that the board may dismiss any teacher 
Section 127 read 
"whenever, in the 
opinion of the board of education, he is not qualified to 
teach, or whenever, in the opinion of the board of education, 
the interests of the schools may require it. 1113 After a 
teacher was conferred with tenure, that teacher could not be 
dismissed until it was approved by a majority vote of all 
members of the board of education; after due notice with 
reasons for dismissal in writing; and after a hearing by the 
board if requested by the teacher within ten days after the 
notice of dismissal. 14 
3) The Right to a Hearing 
The teacher had the right to a hearing al though the 
statutes did not specify who the hearing officer should be. 
This hearing could be made public at the request of either 
teacher or the school board. Specifically, the teacher was 
given the right to be present with counsel and to cross-
11 Id. 
12Id. at Sec. 115 (1941). 
13Id. at Sec. 127 (1941). 
14Id. at Sec. 136c (1941). 
20 
examine witnesses; the right to present defenses to the 
charges against him or her; and the right to call upon the 
board to subpoena witnesses for the teacher up to the limit of 
ten witnesses. It was the responsibility of the board to 
arrange for a stenographic record of the proceedings at the 
hearing. A transcript of such record would be available at 
the cost of the party requesting it. 15 
4) The Right to an Appeal 
Teachers also had the right to appeal the decision of 
the employing board through an appeal committee appointed by 
the county superintendent of schools. The appeal committee 
would review the evidence as recorded and if it found such 
action justified, reverse the decision of the employing board. 
This action would then reinstate the teacher to the former 
position. 16 
Post-Tenure Law: 1941-1961 
Between 1941 and 1961 most changes in the law 
represented a clarification and a refinement in the language 
of the original tenure act. The most major change in the 
statute was the restructuring of SECS. 136b and 136c which 
then became SECS. 24-10 to 24-12. 
Section 136b, which dealt with terms of employment for 
teachers in a district with a board of directors, was 
renumbered to SEC. 24-10 and except for a few minor changes, 
21 
the language virtually remained the same. The thrust of this 
statute was that teachers who fell within the jurisdiction of 
SEC. 24-10, were not eligible for the same due process rights, 
(a hearing for instance) as outlined in SECS. 24-11 and 24-
12. 17 
An Illinois Supreme Court decision in 1946, Pack v. 
Sporleder, 18 made it clear that SEC. 136b (SEC. 24-10) had no 
provision for specific charges against a teacher or any of the 
other procedures as set forth in SEC. 136c (24-12). 
Accordingly, in Pack supra, written notice to a teacher by 
board of school directors, setting forth its reasons why a 
teacher was not to be rehired, was sufficient compliance with 
this section. 19 
Previously, SEC. 136c included both terms of employment 
and procedures for dismissal of tenured teachers. 20 The 
numbering of the 1961 revision, split SEC. 136c into two 
parts--SEC. 24-11 which outlined terms of employment of 
contractual continued service and SEC. 24-12 which listed 
dismissal procedures for teachers, both applicable to 
districts with a board of education or a board of school 
inspectors. 21 
17Id. at Sec. 24-10 (1941). 
18Pack v. Sporleder, 394 Ill. 130, 67 N.E. 2d 198 (1946). 
19Id. 
20ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 24-11 and 24-12 (1961). 
21Id. 
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No significant changes occurred in SEC. 24-11. In the 
first paragraph of this section, "school term" was rewritten 
to read "one year" relative to full-time teaching experience 
prior to the probationary period. It also required the 
employing board to give written notice of an extension of 
probationary period at least sixty days before the "end of the 
period of two consecutive school terms 1122 in lieu of "notice 
before the end of such two-year period. 1123 
Alterations to SEC. 24-12 dealt mainly with teacher 
dismissal regarding an increase in the school population. The 
effect of change in boundaries of school districts by reason 
of the creation of a new school district on contractual 
continued service status of teachers, was added in 1949 and 
incorporated into the 1961 revision. 24 That section was 
amended again in 1955. Added to SEC. 24-12 {then 136c), was 
the proviso that 
the board must first remove all teachers who had not 
entered upon contractual continued service, before 
removing teachers who had entered upon such service in the 
event such removal was the result of a decrease in the 
number of teachers employed or the discontinuance of 
teaching services. 25 
Thus, when positions were going to be eliminated, non-
22 h { ) h In ILL. REV. STAT. C ap. 122, Sec. 24-11 1961 , t e 
word •term' replaced the word 'year•. 
23The phrase 'one-year' and •two-year period' were both 
located in ILL. REV. STAT., Chap. 122, Sec. 136c {1941). 
~Id. at Sec. 136c {1949). 
25Id. (1955). 
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tenured teachers would be discharged before tenured teachers. 
This same section also required that when the board reinstated 
positions, tenured teachers were to be rehired over non-
tenured so far as they were legally qualified to hold such 
positions. Reasons for dismissal were stated in SEC. 10-22.4, 
applicable to board of director districts and districts 
governed by boards of education and boards of school 
inspectors. Those causes did not precipitate dismissal for 
Chicago teachers as different procedures were dictated under 
a separate statute, SEC. 34-85. That statute did not define 
the limitations for cause; rather it stated that teachers may 
only be removed for it. 26 
Causes for dismissal in SEC. 10-22.4 ·included 
incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality or other 
sufficient cause and whenever in the opinion of the board a 
teacher was not qualified to teach, or whenever in the opinion 
of the board the interests of the schools required it. A 1949 
amendment added that marriage was not a cause for removal. 27 
The Hearing Officer: 1975 
The year 1975 brought a notable addition to tenure law--
an impartial hearing officer and rules thereof for dismissal 
of a tenured teacher. Prior to the new regulations, a hearing 
had to be requested by the teacher in writing within a period 
of ten days after the service of notice. The hearing would be 
uid. at Sec. 34-85 (1961). 
Vrd. at Secs. 6-36 and 7-13. 
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held and the decision rendered within a period of sixty days, 
with a ten-day interval between the notice and the hearing. 28 
With the 1975 legislation, the board of education was 
required to schedule a hearing, "unless the teacher within ten 
days requests in writing of the board that no hearing be 
scheduled 1129 In other words, the burden of requesting 
a hearing previously was the responsibility of the teacher. 
With new legislation a hearing was automatic, unless a teacher 
sought the contrary. The hearing was to be scheduled between 
thirty and sixty days after an approval of a motion to dismiss 
by the board of education. 30 
The highlight of the statute was that the hearing 
officer was to be selected from a list of five prospective 
impartial hearing officers, provided by the State Board of 
Education. The teacher and the board or their authorized 
agents or attorneys would then alternately strike one name 
from the list until only one name remained. That person would 
then become the hearing officer. 31 This 1975 legislation 
meant that boards of education could no longer serve as the 
hearing body. 
Another change regarding dismissal in 1975, involved the 
list of causes in SEC. 10-22.4. To the already established 
~Id. at Sec. 24-12 {1975). 
29Id. 
30Id. 
31Id. 
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list, it was added that temporary mental or physical 
incapacity to perform teaching duties as found by a medical 
examination was not a cause for dismissal. 32 
Post-Reform: 1985 
since the inception of the first tenure statute in 1941 
for districts outside of Chicago, there has been a clause 
included which referred to remediability of cause. According 
to SEC. 136c it read: "Before service of notice of charges on 
account of cause that may be deemed to be remediable, there 
shall be given the teacher reasonable warning in writing, 
stating specifically the causes which, if not removed, may 
result in charges. 1133 
When it was determined that a tenured teacher's 
performance would possibly call for dismissal, the district 
would have proceeded to ascertain whether the causes were 
remediable or non-remediable. If the causes were remediable, 
then a notice to remedy was to be sent out to the teacher to 
allow reasonable time to correct those causes before a formal 
motion to dismiss was made. 
Remediability versus irremediability was a subject of 
controversy in several court cases. Gilliland v. Board of 
Education, illustrated the difference between the two terms in 
1977, when the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that: 
A cause for discharge may be deemed irremediable if 
32Id. at Sec. 10-22.4 (1975). 
Eld. at Sec. 136c (1941). 
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evidence indicated that damage had been done to the 
students, the faculty, or the school itself, and that the 
damage could not have been corrected if timely written 
warnings had been given by the teacher's superiors. 
Uncorrected causes for dismissal which originally were 
remediable in nature can become irremediable if continued 
over a long period of time.~ 
In 1985, the additional stipulation of a remediation 
period of one-year was legislated into the remediability 
clause of SEC. 24-12. A remediation plan of one year was 
applicable, beginning with the 1986-87 school, if the teacher 
had deficiencies which were deemed remediable and had been 
given an evaluation rating of "unsatisfactory. 1135 (The 
district itself defined the standards of unsatisfactory under 
ART. 24A.) Teachers whose deficiencies were determined to be 
irremediable by the board of education were not subject to a 
one-year remediation period. However, districts were still 
bound to the other procedures for dismissal defined in SECS. 
24-12 and 34-85, such as notice or hearing. 
The remediation plan was designed to correct the cited 
deficiencies. The teacher who was rated unsatisfactory, as 
well as a district administrator qualified under SEC. 24-3 and 
a consulting teacher selected by the participating 
administrator or the principal of the teacher who had been 
rated unsatisfactory, must participate in the remediation 
34Gilliland v. Board of Education of Pleasant View 
Consolidated School District No. 622 of Tazewell County, 67 
Ill.2d 143, 8 Ill. Dec. 84, 365 N.E.2d 322 (1977). 
35under the reform act of 1989 for the City of Chicago, 
teachers who have been rated satisfactory were subject to a 
forty-five day remediation period. 
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plan. 36 
Participating administrators evaluated and rated the 
teacher on remediation, on a quarterly basis over a year's 
time. A consulting teacher's role was to provide advice to 
the teacher on how to improve teaching skills and to 
successfully complete the remediation plan. It was not 
permissible for a consulting teacher to evaluate the teacher 
on remediation. 37 If the teacher under remediation did not 
complete the one-year remediation period with a "satisfactory" 
or better rating, he was subject to dismissal for cause under 
SEC. 10-22.4. 38 
Nontenured Teachers 
While this paper is concerned only with the analysis of 
dismissal of tenured teachers, the confines of nontenured or 
probationary teachers need to be explained in order to present 
a more complete picture of tenure. 
Illinois employment statutes, such as SEC. 24-11 and 34-
84, mandated that districts follow certain procedures in 
dismissing teachers, varying according to whether a teacher 
was probationary or tenure. Procedures for dismissing 
teachers and the definition of tenured versus probationary, 
were specified by the size of the district. 
Tenure and dismissal procedures for teachers in school 
36ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Art. 24A-5 (1985). 
37Id. 
38Id. at Sec. 10-22.4--Effective January 1, 1988. 
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districts with a population having less than 500,000 
inhabitants were outlined in 1989, in SECS. 24-11 to 24-16. 
This included boards of educations, boards of school 
inspectors and boards of school directors. Falling within 
this category were "special charter districts, and community 
unit districts, high school districts, and community 
consolidated districts."~ (Districts of this type were 
often referred to as "downstate," because they were outside of 
Chicago.) Employment status in those districts was referred 
to as a contractual continued service, with a probationary40 
length of two school terms. 
Sections 34. 84 to 34. 85b applied to teachers in a 
district with a population of over 500,000 people. Thus far, 
the only city falling into this category has been Chicago. 
Section 34. 85 labeled tenure as permanent appointment. Length 
of probationary service time was three years before being 
eligible for such appointment. 
First-Year Probationary Teachers 
Chicago teachers must have served three years of 
'probationary' service before being qualified for permanent 
appointment. Prior to September 1, 1989, the term teacher 
included both teachers and principals whereby both groups were 
39Lee O. Garber and H. Hayes Smith, Law and the Teacher 
in Illinois (Danville, Illinois, 1965), p. 70. 
40Probationary was defined as "serving for trial ... " in 
Anderson v. Board of Education of School District No. 91, 390 
Ill. 412, 61 N.E.2d 579 (1945). 
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eligible for tenure rights. Since that time, the law was 
amended to include only teachers as being eligible for 
permanent appointment. No distinction was made in terms of 
due process rights for first through third-year probationary 
teachers in Chicago. Rights due probationary teachers 
included notice and reason with all final decisions for 
dismissal made by the school board. 41 
The first probationary year for teachers covered under 
SEC. 24-1142 in downstate districts, was described as any 
' 
"full time employment from a date before November 1 through 
the end of the school year. " If the board decided not to 
rehire the teacher for the next school year, written notice 
must have been given at least sixty days before the end of the 
school term. If the school board failed to give notice before 
the specified timeline, the teacher would be considered 
reemployed for the following school term. 43 Notice for 
first-year probationaries did not require including the reason 
for the non-renewal. 
Second-Year Probationary Teachers 
Second-year probationary teachers were those completing 
their second consecutive years of full-time teaching in a 
41 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 34-85 (1988). 
4211 Teacher" meant any or all school district employees 
required to be certified under laws relating to the 
certification of teachers. - ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-
11 (1985). 
43ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-11 (1985). 
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district. Should the district not want the teacher to enter 
into contractual continual service (tenure), written notice 
and reasons for dismissal were to be sent to the teacher by 
certified mail (with return receipt) at least sixty days 
before the end of the second term. 44 
If the teacher had not had one school term of full time 
teaching before the two-year probationary period, the school 
board, at its discretion, may have extended this period for 
one additional school year. This notice had to be sent by 
certified mail sixty days before the end of the second, 
consecutive school term. The notice had to state the reasons 
for the extension and outlined the corrective actions which 
the teacher needed to take in order to satisfactorily complete 
probation. 45 
summary 
The intent of providing tenure in Illinois was to 
provide teachers in public schools with protection against 
arbitrary dismissals and a continuing guarantee of employment. 
Additionally, it allowed for a legal and systematic method of 
dismissing the inefficient teacher. 
Tenure was first conferred to teachers in Chicago in 
1917. The rest of the state followed suit in 1941, with SECS. 
136b and 136c of Chap. 122 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. 
Section 136b provided teachers in smaller districts with a 
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board of directors, continuing contracts subject to 
notification. Larger districts governed by a board of school 
inspector or a board of education, followed the regulations of 
SEC. 136c. This statute allowed teachers to be eligible for 
contractual continued service after a two-year probationary 
period. Teachers under contractual continued service could 
only be dismissed for cause, with notice, reasons, and a 
hearing. Tenure continued to be refined over the years. In 
1961, the language of the original statute was refined for 
more clarity. The numbering was also changed to its present 
state--SECS. 136b and 136c became SECS. 24-10 and 24-11 to 24-
12. 
Separate regulations for board of director districts 
were eliminated in 1967, when these districts were added to 
those under the provisions listed in SEC. 24-11. Regulations 
for Chicago continued to remain apart from others under SECS. 
34-84 and 34-85. Two additional changes have been made to 
tenure legislation in the last two decades: an impartial 
hearing officer in 1975 and a one-year remediation period for 
unsatisfactory teachers after 1985. 
First and second-year probationary teachers were not 
considered to be tenured. The statutes specified different 
legal procedures for dismissal of personnel in those two 
classifications. First-year probationaries could be dismissed 
with only notice and second-year with notice and reason. 
Although the direction tenure will take in the future is 
32 
unclear, it will undergo continual judicial interpretations. 
chapter Three examines statutes and past interpretations of 
case law dealing with tenure during the years 1900 to 1961. 
CHAPTER 3 
EARLY HISTORY OF TENURE IN ILLINOIS 
1900-1961 
Introduction 
Illinois teacher employment legislation between 1900 and 
1961 was characterized by the establishment of uniform 
guidelines for tenure. Regulations governing tenure were 
amended to the Illinois Revised statutes in 1917, for teachers 
of Chicago and in 1941, for board of education districts 
outside Chicago. Tenure was designed specifically to protect 
teachers against the capricious action of school boards. 
According to one Illinois Appellate Court in 1949, the 
objective of tenure was to: 
Improve the Illinois school system by assuring teachers of 
experience and ability a continuous service and a rehiring 
based upon merit rather than failure to rehire upon 
reasons that are political, partisan, or capricious. 1 
Tenure in Illinois developed on two different fronts. 
On one front was Chicago and on the other was all districts 
outside of Chicago. Historically, the initiatives of Chicago 
paved the way for tenure legislation in Chicago and districts 
1Betebenner v. Board of Education of West Salem Community 
High School District No. 201, et al., 336 Ill. App. 448, 84 
N.E.2d 569 (1949). 
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outside Chicago (also referred to as downstate school 
districts) remained separate, each affecting the other as 
tenure law evolved in Illinois. Thus, an interactive 
relationship formed between the two. In this study of tenure 
law in Illinois, both statutes and accompanying case law were 
examined from 1900 to 1961. Within this frame, tenure 
statutes and related case law were analyzed regarding the 
dismissal of elementary and high school teachers. 
One of the outcomes of tenure law and teacher dismissal 
cases was that quite often tenured teachers and employers 
reached a settlement without using litigation. Those 
settlements, of course, are not included in case law and, 
therefore, are not part of this study. 
Teacher Employment Policy in Illinois Downstate School 
Districts: 1900-1940 
Before the establishment of tenure law for downstate 
districts in Illinois in 1941, there was only one statutory 
guideline for school boards to follow when dismissing a 
teacher. More specifically, Illinois state statute vested 
boards of education and boards of directors with the power to 
dismiss teachers for cause. However, each type of school 
district governing board had different powers in relation to 
dismissing teachers for cause. In 1900, CHAP. 122 of the 
Illinois Revised Statutes outlined the following powers, 
accorded to board of director and board of education districts 
when dismissing teachers: 
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Section 115: The BOARD OF DIRECTORS Cin districts 
with under 1.000 inhabitants) shall be clothed with the 
power to ••• dismiss a teacher for incompetency, cruelty, 
negligence, immorality, or other sufficient cause. 2 
Section 127: The BOARD OF EDUCATION (in districts 
with of l, 000 and not over 100, 000 inhabitants) shall have 
all the powers of school directors, be subject to the same 
limitations, and in addition thereto they shall have the 
power ••• to dismiss and remove any teacher, whenever in 
their opinion he is not qualified to teach, or whenever in 
their opinion the interests of the school require it. 3 
Cause for teacher dismissal for board of education or 
board of inspector districts was divided into two parts. 
Section 115, the first part, dealt with the actual conduct of 
the teacher and included incompetency, cruelty, negligence, 
immorality, or other sufficient cause and applied to board of 
director and board of education districts. 4 The second part, 
SEC. 127, "Whenever in the opinion of the board he is not 
qualified to teach or whenever in their opinion the interests 
of the school require it" applied only to board of education 
districts. 5 This latter type of cause depended on the opinion 
of the board of education. 
In Board of Education v. Stotlar, in 1901, the Illinois 
Appellate Court made a distinction between SECS. 115 and 127 
when it stated that: 
Whenever in their opinion the interests of the school 
require it was the cause in itself and was separate from 
2ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 115 (1900). 
3Id. at Sec. 127. 
4Id. at Sec. 115. 
5Id. at Sec. 127. 
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incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality, or other 
sufficient cause. 6 
Although SECS. 115 and 127 enumerated cause, no legal 
safeguards were embodied into those sections which would have 
obligated boards to offer teachers any form of due process, 
such as notice or a hearing, upon being discharged from duty. 
Thus, teachers were open to possible political or arbitrary 
dismissals by school officials as "sufficient cause" and "best 
interests" allowed boards of education a broad interpretation. 
Three of the five Illinois appellate and circuit court cases 
between 1900 and 1916, used either the "best interests" or 
"sufficient cause" as a reason for dismissal. However, school 
districts had to predetermine that these two causes were 
reasons for dismissal at the time of discharge. When one 
district tried to add "the interests of the school require it" 
as a cause for teacher dismissal during a court hearing, the 
appellate court ruled in 1911 that: "causes for dismissal 
contained in the order removing a school teacher were binding 
upon directors"7 and they were estopped from showing other or 
different cause. 
Stotlar8 also recognized, that dismissal under the "best 
interests" clause could possibly be capricious. That issue 
regarding teacher dismissals was not addressed again after 
6Board of Education v. Stotlar, 95 Ill. App. 250 (1901). 
7Darter v. Board of Education of School District No. 30, 
Ill. App. 284 (1911). 
8stotlar, 95 Ill. App. 250. 
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Stotlar until 1934 when the Illinois Supreme Court stated that 
although boards of education were vested with the power to 
dismiss and remove teachers from their job, it wasn't intended 
that it be done arbitrarily or without any reasonable or just 
cause. This court further indicated that: 
'Whenever, in the opinion of the board of education he is 
not qualified to teach, or whenever, in the opinion of the 
board of education, the interests of the school require 
it,' is but another cause of removal. 9 
Sections 115 and 127 wording remaining unchanged through 
the period between 1900 to 1940. An amendment in 19 2 5, 
renumbered SECS. 115 and 127 to SECS. 123 and 136 
respectively. 10 Section 136b was added along with the 
specified causes of SECS. 123 and 136 in 1927, and gave 
teachers in board of inspector and board of education 
districts of under one hundred thousand inhabitants a 
continued contract. 11 Board of director districts of under 
one thousand inhabitants were not adopted into SEC. 136b, 
until 1937. 12 
A continued contract was not to be confused with 
contractual continued service. Continued contracts as 
outlined in CHAP. 122, SEC. 136b, of the Illinois Revised 
Statutes of 1927, provided that school districts could confer 
9Hartmann v. Board of Education of Westville Townshin 
High School District 220, 356 Ill. 577, 191 N.E. 279 (1934). 
10ch. 122, Secs. 123 and 136 (1925). 
11 rd. at sec. 136b (1927). 
12rd. at Sec. 136b (1937). 
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teachers with a contract of up to three years after the 
teacher had taught two consecutive years of probationary 
service. Principals and superintendents were also eligible 
for a continued contract. Under SEC. 136b, if dismissal of a 
contracted teacher was warranted, it had to be for cause as 
elaborated in SECS. 12 3 and 13 6 (formerly SECS. 115 and 
127). 13 Section 136b also stated that when teaching positions 
were eliminated, it was permissible for a school board to 
dismiss without stating the cause. However under those 
conditions, the district had to give the teacher notice prior 
to sixty days before the end of the school year and a 
statement of an honorable dismissal. Notice was not required 
when a district decided not to renew a teacher's contract at 
the end of the contract period. 14 
A continued contract offered teachers a longer contract 
length, but no real protection. There was no obligation on 
the part of the school board at the end of the contract period 
to renew, regardless of the triviality of the reason or lack 
of reason to nonrenew. Because the teacher did not have any 
form of permanent position with a district, there was no 
requirement to rehire at the end of the contract period, nor 
was there any due process requirement. 
When the Illinois legislature amended the school code to 
include continued contracts, the legality of the continued 
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contract was challenged with respect to ART. 8, SEC. I of the 
Illinois Constitution in 1940. This passage of the 
constitution of Illinois stated that "the General Assembly 
shall provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools 
whereby all children of this State may receive a good common 
school education. 1115 Judicially, it was questioned whether 
the Illinois General Assembly had the vested power to alter 
employment legislation in any manner, in order to carry out a 
thorough and efficient system of free schools. In Sloan v. 
School Directors of District 22, the Illinois Supreme Court 
responded that the General Assembly was "allowed a broad 
discretion as to the manner in which to carry out their 
duty. n16 
Similarly, in the 1937 Groves v. Board of Education of 
Chicago17 , the alteration of teacher employment legislation 
was contested when SEC. 133 required compulsory retirement at 
the age of seventy for Chicago teachers. Although mandatory 
retirement was a different issue than continued contracts, the 
holdings of Grove and Sloan were in nature identical: "The 
length of term and the mode of appointment of school teachers 
are under the control of the General Assembly. 1118 
15ILL. CONST. Art 8, Sec. I (1946). 
16sloan v. School Directors of District 220, 373 Ill. 511, 
26 N.E.2d 846 (1940). 
17Groves v. Board of Education of Chicago, 367 Ill. 91, 
10 N.E.2d 403 (1937). 
1sra. 
40 
Perhaps these holdings were timely, in view of changes 
in teacher employment legislation which would come forth after 
1940. Sloan and Groves would justify statutory alterations 
that were to be later amended with the Teacher's Tenure Act of 
1941. 
Teacher Employment Policy in Chicago: 1900-1940 
Chicago teachers were not subject to the same employment 
statutes as those in the downstate school districts. Rather, 
the Chicago Board of Education was bound to the provisions of 
SECS. 133 and 161, 19 of the Illinois Revised Statute in 1900 
which read as follows: 
Section 133: The BOARD OF EDUCATION Cin districts 
of over 100, 000 inhabitants) shall have the power to 
dismiss and remove any teacher for cause in the manner 
provided in section 161 of this act. 
Section 161: No teacher who has been, or who shall 
have been, elected by said board of education, shall be 
removed or discharged, except for cause upon written 
charges which shall upon the teacher's written request, be 
investigated and determined by said board of education, 
whose action and decision in the matter shall be final •.• 
Sections 133 and 161 afforded more rights for Chicago 
teachers than its counterparts, SECS. 115 and 12.7 applicable 
to teachers in board of director and board of education 
districts. Chicago teachers could be dismissed for cause 
according to SEC. 133. However, before the action to dismiss 
was final, the teacher could request written charges of cause 
for dismissal and an investigation into those charges by the 
board of education. Although teachers of Chicago had this 
19ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 133 and 161 (1900). 
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additional option, the effects on fairness were diminished. 
Because cause was neither statutorily nor judicially defined, 
its terms may have been subjective depending on the need of 
the school board. 
Seventeen years later, when the Otis Law was passed in 
1917 ,2° the provisions of SEC. 133 were amended to provide 
teachers and principals with eligibility for permanent 
appointment. Permanent appointment was based on three years 
of satisfactory probationary service and merit. Teachers were 
still subject to dismissal by cause as outlined previously in 
SEC. 161, but they had the additional option of being present 
at a hearing by the school board, to be represented by 
counsel, to offer evidence, and to present defense. 
This statute was the first in Illinois to present the 
opportunity for permanent teaching status, and to give 
teachers the right to a hearing if they were to be dismissed 
from service. Teachers in districts outside of Chicago were 
not effected by enactment of the Otis Laws in 1917. 
To summarize, between 1900 to 1940, judicially initiated 
concepts basic to employment legislation for all Illinois 
school districts came forth: Reasonableness of cause and 
judicial justification for statutory changes in teacher 
employment (such as tenure itself). Upon these concepts, a 
framework would be built over the next twenty years to 
interpret the structure of tenure. 
~Id. at Sec. 133 (1917). 
Tenure in Downstate Board of Education School Districts: 
1941-1961 
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Teacher employment rights in Illinois were first 
legislated for Chicago teachers with the establishment of the 
Otis Law in 1917. This law was followed by provisions for a 
continued contract for teachers in board of education 
districts of under 100, 000 inhabitants in 1927, and for 
teachers in board of director districts in 1937. 
In 1941, the Teacher Tenure Act was passed, applicable 
to teachers in board of education districts of under 500,000 
inhabitants (formerly 100,000) under SEC. 136c of CHAP. 122 of 
the Illinois Revised statutes. 21 Teachers in board of 
inspector districts were not included in this statute. Their 
status was retained with a continued contract under the 
provisions of SEC. 136b. 
Section 136c, or the Teacher Tenure Act, afforded 
teachers the opportunity to be eligible to enter into 
contractual continued service after a specific probationary 
period of employment. As the legislature did not attempt to 
define probationary, the courts construed its meaning. The 
Supreme Court of Illinois in Anderson v. Board of Education of 
School District 91 in 1945, directed that the courts should 
give the word probationary its ordinary meaning. Thus, 
21 Id. at Sec. 136c (1917). 
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probationary meant "serving for trial. 1122 
Probationary employment service, according to SEC. 136c, 
must have been two consecutive years in duration, one of which 
had to be subsequent to the date when the Teacher Tenure Act 
took effect on July 21, 1941. After 1941, the initial influx 
of teacher dismissal cases, primarily dealt with determining 
whether the teacher had fulfilled the probationary period of 
employment. 
One such case involved a teacher who had sought 
reinstatement to her former position. In Anderson, supra, 23 
the teacher contended that she was entitled to contractual 
continued service as she had taught under two, one-year 
contracts. She was contracted to teach on May 4, 1940 for the 
1940-41 school year, and on May 2, 1941 for the 1941-42 school 
year. Anderson sought to apply the two, one-year contracts 
towards fulfilling the probationary period. 
In keeping with the ordinary meaning of the word "year, " 
the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the length of "year" 
meant a calendar year of twelve months. Therefore, because 
the teacher's contracts did not collectively amount to twenty-
four months, the court held that the required probationary 
period was not met. 24 
22Anderson v. Board of Education of School District 91, 
390 Ill. 412, 61 N.E.2d 562 (1945). 
23Id. 
24Id. 
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This requirement regarding the probationary period was 
later reaffirmed in 1946, when it was ruled that a 
superintendent did not meet the two-year period of probation 
because he had served one year, eleven months and eight days 
of the period of employment after the date of the Tenure 
Act. 25 The courts remained bound to the twelve-month 
calendar year interpretation handed down in Anderson supra, 
until 1949 in the Illinois Revised statutes, when the word 
"year" was amended to read "school term. 1126 
Just as the words "year" and "probationary" from SEC. 
136c were judicially interpreted in a literal fashion prior to 
1949, the probationary service period before and after the 
enactment of the Tenure Act was also read in like manner. 
Regarding this period of probationary service the Supreme 
Court of Illinois in 1945 commented that: 
A statute will be deemed to operate prospectively 
only . . . A teacher's employment is not automatically 
probationary by virtue of the statute. 27 
In this passage the court meant that the period 
occurring prior to the date of the Act could not be counted as 
probationary, unless there was a contract between two parties 
stating these terms. Service incurred after the Tenure Act 
was judicially interpreted as being automatically 
25Wilson v. Board of Education of School District No. 125, 
et al., 394 Ill. 197, 68 N.E.2d 257 (1946). 
26ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c (1949). 
27Anderson, 390 Ill. 412 (1945). 
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probationary, even if it wasn't specified in the contract. A 
1949 appellate court stated, regarding service incurred after 
the Tenure Act, that: 
All service by teachers under contracts entered into 
after the effective data of the Tenure Act, even though 
the contract is silent as to probationary period, is 
intended and deemed to be probationary until such time as 
the teacher acquires contractual continued service 
status. 28 
The determination of whether the probationary period 
occurred before, or after the Tenure Act was critical for both 
boards and teachers. Any teacher who had fulfilled the 
probationary period, would enter into contractual continued 
service unless the board had decided to dismiss the teacher 
for cause. Section 136c stipulated that if the employing 
board at the end of a teacher's second year of probationary 
service had decided not to retain the teacher, they had to 
notify the teacher first in writing, by registered mail at 
least sixty days before the end of the probationary period, 
providing the specific reasons for dismissal. First-year 
probationary teachers were not addressed in the Act in terms 
of the employing board providing the teacher with any type of 
notification or reason, if the teacher's contract was not to 
be renewed for a secondary probationary year of service. 
Therefore, it was not mandated that boards of education serve 
notice or reason to a teacher, if they wished not to renew the 
teacher for the following school year. 
28Betebenner, 336 Ill. App. 448 (1949). 
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Although SEC. 136c required teachers to fulfill a two-
year probationary term, before establishing eligibility for 
contractual continued service, this time period could be 
extended by the school district under certain circumstances. 
Thus, when a teacher had not completed one year of full-time 
teaching experience prior to the beginning of the probationary 
period, the Tenure Act provided a school board with the option 
of extending a teacher's probation for one additional year. 
In order to extend this period the board had to give the 
teacher written notice by registered mail at least sixty days 
before the end of the two-year period. 29 
Once a teacher was conferred with contractual continued 
service, by statute, it ceased when the teacher reached the 
age of sixty-five. Following the teacher's sixty-fifth 
birthday, employment was then determined on an annual 
basis. 30 
In spite of a teacher's entry into contractual continued 
service, the employing board could remove or dismiss tenured 
teachers for the causes provided in SECS. 123 and 136. These 
causes were: 
Section 123 - ••• Incompetency, cruelty, negligence, 
or other sufficient cause and 
Section 13 6 - ••• Whenever in the opinion of the 
board of education, he is not qualified to teach, or 
whenever in the opinion of the board, the interests of the 
29ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c {1941). 
30Id. 
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school may require it. 31 
In addition to dismissal for cause, SEC. 136c also 
provided regulations for discharge of a tenured teacher due to 
a decrease because of the discontinuance of a particular type 
of teaching service. In such a situation, the statute 
required that the teacher would receive a written notice of 
dismissal by registered mail with a statement of honorable 
dismissal and reasons thereof sixty days before the end of the 
school term. 32 
In Wilson, supra, the Supreme Court did not approve the 
elimination of a position, where the real motive was to remove 
the employee from his position without justification. 33 This 
meant that public school districts could not use SEC. 136c 
reasons unless those conditions specified in SEC. 136c 
actually were present in the district. 
If a tenured teacher was to be removed or dismissed for 
any of the causes stated in SECS. 123 and 136, provisions for 
discharge differed from those of a reduction in teaching 
force. When dismissing teachers for cause, SEC. 136c required 
that dismissal would not become effective until the charges 
were approved by a majority vote of all members of the board 
of education and after a hearing, if requested in writing by 
31 Id. at Secs. 123 and 136c (1941). 
~Id. at Sec. 136c (1941). 
33wilson, 394 Ill. 197 (1946). 
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the teacher within ten days after the service of notice.~ 
The statute further provided that written notice of the 
charges based on cause had to be given to the teacher at least 
sixty days before the effective date of dismissal, which date 
was between November first and the date of the close of the 
school term. 35 A 1959 case ruled that such charges for 
dismissal had to be substantial.~ 
After the hearing was requested by the teacher it had to 
be held and the decision rendered within a period of sixty 
days. No less than ten days could intervene between the date 
of the notice for the hearing and the hearing itself. The 
hearing could be public at either the request of the teacher 
or the board of education. The Tenure Act of 1941, did not 
specify the utilization of an impartial hearing officer. 
Members of the board of education, and sometimes the 
superintendent of the school district, heard the case. Though 
there was not a provision for an impartial hearing officer, 
the ACT did provide that the teacher could be present at the 
hearing with counsel; witnesses could be cross-examined; 
evidence and defense of the charges could be offered. 
Section 136c further stipulated in 1941, that decisions 
regarding the reasons or causes for dismissal by the board of 
~ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, SEC. 136c (1941). 
35Id. 
~Lusk v. Community Consolidated School District 95, 20 
Ill. App. 2d 252, 155 N.E. 2d 650 (1959). 
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education were to be considered final, unless a teacher 
appealed to the county superintendent within a period of ten 
days. An appeal committee would then review the decision and 
would either agree with the board of education or reverse the 
decision of the board and reinstate the teacher. 37 Under the 
Administrative Review Act, a judicial review of administrative 
decisions regarding dismissal made by the appeal from the 
county's office was added in 1945. 38 Duties of the county 
superintendent's office in the appeal process, were later 
removed in 1953. 
This action, of eliminating the county superintendent's 
office from the appeal process, gave the school board more 
adjucative authority. Previously, there was another layer to 
the appeal hierarchy, the county superintendent, before going 
on to the administrative review. Because that layer was 
eliminated, a greater emphasis was placed on the school board 
to resolve any problems at the local level. Al though a school 
board could not hear legal questions, the courts recognized 
that school boards were the best forum for the resolution of 
local educational problems. 39 It was recognized in the 
Illinois Administrative Review Act, that: 
A school board's findings regarding facts requiring 
adjudication will generally not be reviewed unless opposed 
to the substantial weight of the evidence, or unless 
37ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c (1941). 
38Id. at Sec. 24-8 (1945). 
39Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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indicative of an abuse of discretion. 40 
One clause in SEC. 136c that conceded boards of 
education a similar type of local control was remediability. 
Regarding remediability, SEC. 136c stated in 1941 that: 
Before service of notice of charges on account of 
causes that may be deemed to be remediable, there shall be 
given the teacher reasonable warning in writing starting 
specificall~ the causes which if not removed, may result 
in changes • 1 
Remediability became a contended section of the Teacher 
Tenure Act between boards and teachers. Although what 
constituted remediability was not defined, the intent of the 
statute was to allow the teacher sufficient time to remedy 
deficiencies which could result in charges of dismissal. 
A leading Illinois Appellate Court decision pertaining 
to remediability was in Meredith v. Board of Education of 
Community Unit School District No. 7 in 1955. 42 In Meredith, 
the school board dismissed a tenured teacher who had refused 
to give up his outside activities and because the best 
interests of the school required it. Meredith was an 
agriculture teacher for the district and also sold fertilizer 
and seed oats. As his business expanded, the board believed 
that it interfered with his teaching duties. Meredith 
contended that he should not have been dismissed, because the 
40ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110, Sec. 264 (1945). 
41 rd. at sec. 136c (1941). 
42Meredi th v. Board of Education of Community Unit School 
District No. 7, 7 Ill. App. 2d 477, 130 N.E.2d 477, 130 N.E.2d 
5 (1955). 
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cited causes were remediable. This would have required that 
he be given notice of remediability, thereby making the 
dismissal invalid. 43 
The appellate court affirmed the decision in favor of 
the board of education. However, the court did not make 
reference to whether the cause was remediable, nor that the 
board had acted in bad faith. Rather the court, in a sense, 
abdicated its judicial responsibility by holding that it was 
a discretionary power of the board to determine whether causes 
' 
for dismissal were remediable. It was also held in Meredith 
that: 
The best interest of the school of the district is the 
guiding star of the board of education and for courts to 
interfere with the exercise of the powers of the board in 
that respect is an unwarranted assumption of authority and 
can only be justified in cases where the board has acted 
maliciously, capriciously, and arbitrarily. 44 
This "guiding star" philosophy became the judicial rule 
of thumb for court cases involving remediability of cause for 
dismissal in the late fifties and early sixties. The court, 
in allowing boards of education to determine remediability of 
cause as in Meredith, increased the adjudicative authority of 
boards of education by leaving remediability open to their 
interpretation. No qualifying guidelines were delineated as 
to what constituted best interests, rather this was left to 
the board's determination. It would have seemed plausible 
52 
that boards used this to their own benefit. If a board wanted 
to dismiss a teacher expediently, it could declare the 
teacher's behavior irremediable and avoid the more time-
consuming period of remediation. The legislative intent of 
tenure was negated when boards did this, because teachers were 
denied time to remediate which is a part of due process. 
Broad discretionary power in determining remediability 
paralleled the same authority that courts maintained should be 
extended to the boards in the area of dismissal for sufficient 
cause and when the interests of the school required it. In 
Joyce v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, an appellate 
court again applied the same rule of board discretionary power 
in 1945, when it said: 
the rule to be deduced from the authorities is that where 
the statute is silent as to what constitutes cause, the 
right to determine the question is in the tribunal having 
jurisdiction of the particular officer or employee. 45 
The board when exercising its discretionary power in 
determining what constituted sufficient cause for dismissal of 
a teacher, could only be overruled by the court when there was 
an abuse of that discretion or when the decision was without 
substantial evidence. Muehle v. School District No. 38 
reiterated this when the court wrote that: 
School districts are vested by the Statute with 
authority to dismiss a teacher for, among other specified 
grounds, 'other sufficient cause.' It is axiomatic that 
such authority vests a discretion trammeled only by proof 
45Joyce v. Board of Education of Chicago, 325 Ill. App. 
543, 60 N.E.2d 431 (1945). 
53 
of that discretion's abuse.~ 
The Administrative Review Act had also elaborated in 
1945 on findings being prima facie true and correct: "It is 
only where its [the board of education] decision is without 
substantial foundation in the record or manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence that the same will be set aside. 1147 
As with remediability, the courts did not specify the 
definition of sufficient cause or the interests of the school. 
The court's lack of interpretation resulted in boards of 
education claiming almost an absolute discretion in this area. 
Most any dismissal could be rationalized as sufficient cause 
or when the interests of the school required it. Further, 
when outside factors that were unrelated to teaching 
performance entered into dismissal, the likelihood increased 
that the factors were motivated by political reasons or 
personal dislike. With all dismissal cases, the question 
would be whether the courts were able to reach decisions that 
recognized if discretionary abuse was present. 
Between 1950 and 1961 Illinois court decisions regarding 
teacher dismissal for sufficient cause or for the interests of 
the school, were fairly evenly split between favoring the 
teacher or the board. In those court cases where it was 
decided in favor of the teacher, it was either because the 
46Muehle v. School District No. 38, 344 Ill. App. 365, 100 
N.E.2d 805 (1951). 
47ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110, Sec. 264 (1945). 
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cause was found to be remediable or because there was 
insufficient evidence to sustain the finding. Insubordination 
and a lack of discipline were found to be remediable in 
1958, 48 while a 1961 appellate court decision ruled there was 
insufficient evidence where a board was unable to show the 
teacher's failure to do his duty. 49 In the matter of 
Hauswald v. Board of Education of Community High School 
District No. 217, an insufficiency of teaching techniques was 
found to be remediable and did not qualify for immediate 
dismissal under the "best interests" clause. 50 
Dismissals of public school teachers in Illinois which 
were upheld in favor of the boards of education were for such 
reasons as the use of profanity in the classroom, involvement 
in a job outside of school, 51 uncontrollable temper with 
peers and students, 52 and public intoxication. 53 
In Keyes v. Board of Education of Maroa Community Unit 
48smi th v. Board of Education of Community Unit School 
District No. 1, 19 Ill. App. 2d 224, 153 N.E.2d 377 (1958). 
49Allione v. Board of Education of South Fork Community 
High School District No. 310, 29 Ill. App. 2d 261, 173 N.E.2d 
13 ( 1961) • 
50Hauswald v. Board of Education of Community High School 
District No. 217, 20 Ill. App.2d 49, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1958). 
51Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955). 
52Pearson v. Board of Education of Alton Community Unit 
School District No. 5, 12 Ill. App.2d 344, 138 N.E.2d 326 
(1956). 
53scott v. Board of Education of Al ton Community Unit 
School District No. 11, et al., 20 Ill. App.2d 292, 156 N.E.2d 
1 (1959). 
55 
School District No. 2 of Macon and DeWitt Counties, dismissal 
of a superintendent for actively participating in fomenting 
controversy, conflict and dissention in the district and 
failing to cooperate with the Board and his subordinate was 
affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court. It was made clear 
in Keyes, supra in 1959, that the court was not concerned with 
the wisdom of the decision of the Board, but only if whether 
it was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 54 
Very specifically, in cases involving sufficient cause 
and the interests of the school, the Illinois courts 
consistently looked at the manifest weight of the evidence to 
determine if the dismissal was valid. Courts did not always 
look at the politics involved in the dismissal though, despite 
the premise that a board of education's discretionary abuse 
would be overruled. Where a superintendent was dismissed for 
fomenting controversy, conflict, and dissention55 and an 
agriculture was dismissed for his outside fertilizer and seed 
oat business, 56 the underlying reason was more than likely 
political in nature. 
Overall appellate and supreme court interpretations of 
the Tenure Act, between 1941 and 1961 in Illinois, were 
generally conservative. Because courts could not draw upon 
54Keyes v. Board of Education of Maroa Community Unit 
School District No. 2, 20 Ill. App.2d 504, 156 N.E.2d 763 
(1959). 
55wilson, 394 Ill. 197 (1946). 
56Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955). 
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tested decisions, interpretations of tenure statutes were 
structured so as not to enlarge its scope. In doing so, court 
decisions more than often favored the boards of education 
rather than teachers. 
One issue that was not addressed in the Teacher Tenure 
Act of 1941 was that of married female teachers, in relation 
to dismissal from a teaching position. The issue was whether 
it was beyond the power of boards of education to adopt rules 
that were not statutorily regulated. 
In Templeton, et al. v. Board of Education of Township 
High School District No. 201, et al. in 1948, 57 the 
appellants, a group of married female teachers, not only felt 
that their statutory rights were violated, but also that their 
constitutional rights were denied. District No. 201, in 1936, 
had adopted the policy of not hiring married women. Those who 
were employed and already married were allowed to stay no more 
than two years beyond that year. The board agreed to hold 
this policy in abeyance between 1938 and 1945, because the 
United States was at war. At the close of the war the board 
decided to reaffirm and enforce its former policy that married 
women could only be retained two years after marriage. The 
appellants filed for a writ of mandamus to reinstate them to 
their former positions. On a direct appeal from the Circuit 
Court, the Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the writ of 
57People ex. re. Templeton et al. v. Board of Education 
of Township High School District No. 201. et al. , 399 Ill. 
204, 77 N.E.2d 200 {1948). 
57 
mandamus and intervened with a writ of certiorari. Further, 
the court stated in Templeton that: 
The application of a statute does not present a 
constitutional question so as to authorize a direct appeal 
to this court. The Appellate Court will not render a 
judgment in conflict with a litigant's constitutional 
rights. 58 
The case was then transferred to the Appellate Court where it 
was found "that it was within the power of the Board of 
Education to have a rule against retention of married female 
teachers and did not violate the Teacher's Tenure Law. 1159 A 
rehearing was denied. 
Earlier cases, such as Christner v. Hamilton in Oak Park 
(1945) 60 and McGuire v. Etherton in Murphysboro {1944) 61 
ruled similarly. The Illinois Appellate Court in McGuire v. 
Etherton, ruled that it was sufficient cause to dismiss 
married teachers and "that the School Act gives the power to 
the Board to adopt and enforce all necessary rules and 
regulations for management and government of public schools of 
their district."~ 
Thus, what was found was a situation where married women 
were encouraged to join the workforce for a short period of 
60christner v. Hamilton, et al., 324 Ill. App. 612, 59 
N.E.2d 198 {1945). 
61McGuire v. Etherton County Superintendent of Schools, 
et al., 324 Ill. App. 161, 57 N.E.2d 649 {1944). 
62Id. 
58 
time, under conditions where being a working woman was 
socially acceptable. When the unwritten rules changed, many 
of the women had been the new status and did not want to stop 
teaching. Many men served in the armed forces between 1940 
and 1945, creating a manpower shortage in various areas of 
employment. As a result, there was a greater demand for 
females to fill this void in the labor force. The fact of 
national need and patriotic service at this time removed many 
of the social disabilities previously incurred by "working 
women." Immediately .after the war, there was a decrease in 
the need for female employees, as it was more desirable to 
employ men returning from the war. 
Although many women ceased paid employment at the end of 
World War II, a larger percentage continued in business and 
industry than in any previous peacetime period of the United 
States. In 1950, 30 percent of the United States labor forced 
was composed of women. Nearly half of the women employed were 
married. Working mothers constituted more than twenty percent 
of all mothers of children under eighteen. While the total 
labor force of the United States more than doubled between 
1900 and 1951, the number of working women more than 
tripled. 63 This increase in the amount of working women, 
coupled with a demand for greater equality, led to changes in 
the types of jobs open for women in the latter part of the 
63American Peoples Encyclopedia, Volume 20, Chicago: 
Spencer Press, Inc., 1957. 
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century. The change in Illinois law was a part of this 
evolution, where in 1949 the legislature established that 
marriage was not a cause for dismissal from teachincf4 thus 
making illegal any former contractual provisions against it. 
One of the concerns about tenure for married female 
teachers mentioned in a national survey to superintendents and 
board members in 1939, was "that married teachers would hang 
on for dear life to their jobs as long as it was possible, and 
that would make it difficult for young graduates who were 
seeking employment. 1165 This reason seemed arbitrary and 
without basis at best, but was indicative of the sentiments at 
that time. Of those surveyed, forty-four percent of the board 
members and forty-two percent of the superintendents felt that 
marriage should be a cause for dismissal of teachers on 
tenure.~ Perhaps Illinois did not legislate marriage as not 
being a cause for dismissal until 1949, because local 
sentiments paralleled those nationally. Also, in the fifties 
there was a greater push for establishing teachers' rights in 
general. 
Tenure in Downstate Board of Director Districts: 
1941-1961 
The terms of employment for teachers in board of 
MILL. REV. STAT. CH. 122, SECS. 6-36 and 7-13 (1949). 
6511opinions on Tenure: 
Superintendents Committee on 
Association, May, 1939, p. 6. 
~Ibid., p. 22. 
Schoolboards Members and 
Tenure," National Education 
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director districts, were not included with SEC. 136c either. 
This district type remained classified under SEC. 136b, 67 
with a three-year continued contract for teachers, principals, 
and superintendents following a two-year probationary period. 
Employee dismissal procedures changed somewhat though, 
due to the influence of the removal process in the new teacher 
tenure provision. Prior to 1941 notice of nonrenewal in SEC. 
136b, was only provided to teachers receiving an honorable 
dismissal. After being amended, the Act mandated that it was 
the duty of the board of school directors "on or before April 
2 5 of each year in which any regular employment contract 
expires to notify in writing said employee concerning his 
reemployment or lack thereof." Further, when a teacher was 
not rehired, notification had to be accompanied by the written 
reasons for the action. Failing to issue a notice would 
constitute reemployment by default.~ The proviso of notice 
in SEC. 136b, did not match the due process rights provided 
teachers under the tenure statute, SEC. 136c, as board of 
director districts were not required to provide a hearing or 
an appeal process. Additionally, any form of security in 
employment did not go beyond a three-year contract. 
over the next twenty years, few amendments were added to 
continued contracts and statutes pertaining to tenure. The 
language of SEC. 136b was refined to reflect greater clarity. 
67ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136b (1941). 
~Id. 
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some passages were deleted, while others were added. 
Tenure Statutes for Chicago: 1941-1961 
The tenure plan for Chicago teachers, first enacted in 
1917, was very similar to contractual continued service. 
There were some differences however, in the technical 
structure of both statutes. 
The length of probationary service for Chicago teachers 
under SEC. 186, was for three years as opposed to two years 
for teachers in downstate board of education districts. Also 
the terminology used for tenure differed in Chicago. Rather 
than use the term contractual continued service for tenured 
teachers, SEC. 186 referred to tenure as a permanent 
appointment. Permanent appointment was based on merit after 
satisfactory probationary service. The appointment was 
automatic, if a teacher was not given notice of dismissal. 69 
The actual dismissal of permanently appointed teachers 
was based upon cause. Other than being subject to the rules 
of the Board of Education concerning conduct and efficiency, 
cause was not defined. 
Notification and hearing for Chicago teachers also 
differed from those procedures specified in SEC. 136c for 
teachers downstate. In SEC. 136c, 70 charges would become 
effective after being approved by a majority of the board 
members. After this approval, notice of these charges would 
69Id. at Sec. 186 (1941). 
roid. at Sec. 136c (1941). 
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be served at least sixty days before dismissal. A hearing 
could be called if the teacher requested one within ten days 
after having been served notice. 
As opposed to SEC. 136c, teachers subject to SEC. 186 
were served first with a thirty-day notice listing charges. 
The written charges were then presented by the superintendent, 
to be heard by the board or an authorized committee at the 
expiration of the thirty days of the notice presented to the 
teacher. The teacher could be present at the hearing with 
counsel, and evidence and defense could be offered. Section 
186 did not delineate whether cross-examination of witnesses 
was permissible. 
was final, with 
superintendent.n 
At this hearing the decision of the board 
no allowance for appeal to the county 
The two statutes, SECS. 136c and 186, had many common 
elements. But at the same time there were some wide 
variances. It would seem that teachers covered under SEC. 
136c, were subject to a greater amount of procedural rights at 
dismissal. There was a longer length of notice required. By 
offering sixty days in SEC. 136c, rather than thirty, 
downstate teachers were allowed considerably more time to 
prepare their own defense for a hearing. 
Chicago teachers, in addition to having had less notice 
of hearing, did not have the opportunity to correct a 
deficiency if it was remediable. Remediability was not a 
nld at sec. 186 {1941). 
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criterion included in SEC. 186. 72 Also, the tenure for Chicago 
teachers did not include an appeal process. A dissatisfied 
teacher's only recourse, would have been to appeal judicially 
to the circuit court. 
Chicago tenure legislation had remained unchanged since 
1917, when the Teacher Tenure Act was passed in July of 1941. 
Chicago, at that time, was a political entity, separate from 
the remainder of the state. To include Chicago teachers in 
the Teacher Tenure Act would have meant that downstate groups 
would have had to work with the Chicago Teacher's Union, the 
superintendent, the board members, the mayor and others from 
Chicago to obtain passage of the Act. Thus it would have been 
easier to leave the statute for Chicago teachers separate, 
rather than work together for one common status. 
Summary 
Employment legislation for teachers in Illinois public 
schools during 1900 and 1961, was characterized by the 
establishment of a basic set of rules that allowed for job 
security and provided fair and consistent procedures for 
tenured teachers being dismissed. The amount of job security 
and the procedures to be used in the event of discharge 
depended upon whether the teacher was probationary or tenured 
and according to the size of the district in which the teacher 
was employed. In Donahoo v. Board of Education of School 
District No. 303, the Illinois Supreme Court commented on the 
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difference between dismissal rights for probationary teachers 
and tenured teachers when it commented that: 
The legislature recognized the difference between 
dismissing the probationer and the teacher who had gained 
contractual continued service, by providing the more 
elaborate and strict method for dismissal of the 
latter. 73 
Teacher tenure legislation was enacted in 1917 for 
Chicago teachers, 1941 for teachers in a board of education or 
board of school inspector district of under 500,000 
inhabitants, and 1967 for teachers in a board of directors 
district of under 1,000 inhabitants. 
Al though tenure regulations afforded more employment 
rights in the workplace for teachers, this was somewhat 
overshadowed as school boards had vast powers in terms of 
discretionary authority. Some sections of the Tenure Act were 
vaguely written and were open to broad interpretations. The 
court chose to strictly construe this passages, so as not to 
enlarge the intent of the statute. In this manner, their 
interpretations were more advantageous to boards of education 
than teachers. Although teachers had more employment rights 
in the 1960's than they did in the early 1900's, the balance 
of power between teacher and board still leaned toward the 
board. 
Chapter Four will continue to explore tenure legislation 
and related case law involving dismissal of tenured teachers 
73Donahoo v. Board of Education of School District No. 
303, et al., 413 Ill. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787 (1952). 
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in the era of pre-reform, from 1961 to 1975. Constitutional 
issues will also be examined, in relation to Illinois 
statutory provisions for tenure. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE HEARING OFFICER: 1961-1975 
Introduction 
Illinois tenure legislation developed during 1961 to 
1975, whereby there was an emphasis placed on establishing 
greater employment rights for tenured teachers at dismissal. 
This was achieved through the addition of guidelines for an 
impartial hearing officer and a more thorough judicial 
scrutiny over a school board's determination of remediable 
versus irremediable cause for dismissal. Further, "property" 
and "liberty" interests as reviewed in the landmark decisions 
made by the U.S. Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth1 
and Perry v. Sindermann2 , also effected teacher employment 
rights in Illinois. 
This chapter records statutory treatment of tenure in 
Chicago and downstate Illinois public school districts from 
1961 to 1975. Additionally federal and state case law is 
analyzed, focusing on the issues of: 
1. Remediability; 
1Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L.E.2D 548, 92 S. Ct. 
2701 (1972). 
2Perry v. sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 33 L.E.2D 570, 92 
S . Ct . 2 6 9 4 ( 19 7 2 ) . 
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2. Tenure status of Illinois superintendents and 
principals; and 
3. "Property" and "liberty" interests. 
Tenure in Downstate Districts: 1961-1975 
The most prominent change in Illinois employment 
statutes during the period between 1961 and 1975, was the 
addition of an impartial hearing officer to preside over 
tenured teacher dismissal hearings. According to SEC. 24-12 
of the Illinois Revised Statutes of 1975, a hearing officer's 
duty was to render a decision as to whether the tenured 
teacher would be dismissed, unless the decision of the hearing 
officer was to be reviewed according to the provisions of the 
Administrative Review Act. 3 Prior to 1975, the school code 
designated that school boards officiate over hearing 
proceedings and make the final decision to dismiss a tenured 
teacher. 
Other requirements of SEC. 24-12 regarding the dismissal 
hearing were that unless a teacher within ten days requested 
in writing that no hearing be scheduled, the school board was 
required to hold a hearing on the dismissal charges before a 
disinterested hearing officer. There were two qualifications 
that the statute specified for the hearing officer: (1) 
accreditation by the National Arbitration Association; and (2) 
nonresidency in the school district in which the teacher being 
dismissed was employed. From a list of five prospective 
3ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1975). 
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candidates provided by the Illinois State Board of Education, 
the school board and the teacher or either of their legal 
counsels would alternately strike a name from the list until 
one name remained. This person would then become the hearing 
officer. Final selection of the hearing officer had to be 
completed within a five-day period. 
Other duties accorded to the hearing officer by SEC. 24-
12 were to: 
1. Issue subpoenas. A limitation of ten witnesses 
could be subpoenaed on behalf of either the board 
or the teacher. Testimony of witnesses was to be 
taken under oath administered by the hearing 
officer. 
2. Keep a record of the proceedings by employing a 
reporter to take stenographic or stenotype notes of 
all testimony. Costs of employing the reporter 
would be paid by the State Board of Education. 
Although Illinois school boards no longer maintained 
jurisdiction to make final dismissal decisions with the 1975 
hearing officer legislation, it was still their responsibility 
to fulfill certain statutory procedural steps. Those steps 
included: 
1. Determining if cause for dismissal was remediable 
before making a motion to dismiss. If remediable, 
the board had to give the teacher reasonable 
warning in writing alerting the teacher that if the 
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causes were not removed they would result in 
charges. 
2. Adhering to other distinct statutory guidelines: 
a. Approve motion to dismiss containing specific 
charges by a majority vote of its members. 
b. Serve written notice to the teacher to be 
dismissed at least twenty-one days before the 
hearing date. 
c. Set hearing date no less than thirty days nor 
more than sixty days after motion to dismiss. 4 
In 1975, "reasonable warning" had not been defined 
statutorily or judicially within any precise time frame. 
Remediability's definition generated judicial activity before 
and after 1975, as boards of education broadly construed its 
meaning in the absence of state statutory guidelines. Two 
major Illinois court decisions however, Meredith v. Board of 
Education of Community Unit School District No. 7 (1955) and 
Gilliland v. Board of Education (1977) attempted to clarify 
the parameter of remediability. 5 
Meredith, supra6 was one of the first decisions which 
directly addressed the issue of remediability. 
Generally during the period immediately after the 
4Id. 
5Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955); Gilliland v. Board 
of Education of Pleasant View Consolidated School District No, 
622, 67 Ill. 2d 143, 365 N.E.2d 322 (1977). 
6Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955). 
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initiation of tenure, the Illinois court system held to the 
doctrine of interpreting the tenure act so as not to expand 
the act's meaning and burden the persons (referring to school 
boards) subject to its operation. 7 Donahoo, supra, in 1951, 
stated that 
It has been repeatedly held by the Appellate Courts 
of this state that the tenure law, being in derogation of 
the common law and creating new liability, should be 
strictly construed in favor of the Board of Education. 8 
Maintaining that same posture, the appellate court in 
Meredith ruled that in determining remediability of cause, 
The best interests of the schools of the district is 
the guiding star of the boards of education and for the 
courts to interfere with the exercise of the powers of the 
board in that respect is an unwarranted assumption of 
authority and can only be justified in cases where the 
board has acted maliciously, capriciously, and 
arbitrarily. 9 
This philosophy of "best interests, 11 changed somewhat in 
ensuing years, when several Illinois courts reiterated that 
the judicial system was vested with the power of review to 
test the exercise of the school board's discretion. Thus, a 
review by the court could determine whether the board's 
findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence10 
Without this judicial insulation, tenure laws would have had 
7Anderson, 390 Ill. 412 (1945). 
8Donahoo, 346 Ill. App. 241 (1951). 
9Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955). 
10Eveland v. Board of Education Paris Union School 
District, 340 Ill. App. 308, 92 N.E.2d 182 (1950). Meredith, 
7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955). Werner v. Community Unit School 
District No. 4, 40 Ill. App.2d 491, 190 N.E.2d 184 (1963). 
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no value as protection to teachers as boards would have then 
been able to arbitrarily or without cause dismiss teachers. 
courts looked for boards of education to prove that reasons 
and causes for discharge existed, and also that the reasons 
and causes were not remediable. Thus, in the foregoing years 
leading to the 1977 Gilliland decision, 11 what developed was 
a criterion for a more strict judiciary examination of a 
school board's determination of irremedial cause. 
In keeping with the philosophy of an austere scrutiny 
after Meredith, the appellate court in Jepsen v. Board of 
Education of Community School District No. 307 (1958) 12 and 
later Werner v. Community Unit School District No. 4 
( 1963) , 13 noted that 
A cause not remediable is where damage has not been done; 
• • • such that . • . any of the causes proved inflicted 
damage or injury to the school, students or faculty. 14 
In the Jepsen15 case, the teacher had accused the 
principal of the school of knowingly permitting an ineligible 
player to participate in a football game. It was felt by the 
appellate court, that the cause for dismissal, which was the 
11Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 ( 1977) . 
12Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955). Jepsen v. Board of 
Education of Community Unit School District No. 307, 19 Ill. 
App.2d 204, 153 N.E.2d 417 (1958). 
13Werner, 40 Ill. App. 2d 491 ( 1963) • 
14Jepsen, 19 Ill. App.2d 204 (1958). Werner, 40 Ill. 
App.2d 491 (1963). 
15Jepsen, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204 ( 1958) . 
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teacher accusing the principal of concealing or attempting to 
conceal the ineligibility of a football player was 
irremediable. Accordingly, with the accusation having been 
made, the damage to the school, students or the faculty was 
done and could not have been repaired or remedied. 
Werner's charges centered around alleged incompetency. 
Contrary to the Jepsen16 decision, an Illinois appellate 
court ruled in Werner that the cause was remediable because: 
There was nothing in the record to suggest damage or 
injury was inflicted to the school, students or faculty 
which could not have been remedied if complaints had been 
made to Werner when knowledge of the causes first came to 
the attention of her superiors and there was not evidence 
or reason inferable from the record why plaintiff would 
not have corrected the causes if her superiors had warned 
her or made complaint about the causes. 17 
Key to the two cases and those which followed was not so 
much the damage the teacher's behavior could or did cause, but 
whether the behavior could have been corrected upon being 
warned. Warning of causes which might become charges for 
dismissal was considered by Illinois courts to be an important 
right guaranteed to teachers through tenure law. This concept 
was emphasized repeatedly in different court decisions 
regarding teacher dismissal. Hauswald, supra, had stated that 
"the right for teachers to be informed about causes that are 
remediable and to have the opportunity to correct such causes 
16Id. 
17werner, 40 Ill. App.2d 49 (1958). 
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go to the heart of the Tenure System. 1118 In teacher 
dismissal cases, such as Werner, 19 where cause was judicially 
deemed remediable, it was often because there was no evidence 
that a plaintiff was given either repeated or single warnings 
by a superior. School boards frequently circumvented this 
requirement of sending a warning notice by countering that the 
causes were irremediable; thus a letter of warning to the 
teacher was unnecessary. Perhaps in recognizing that 
districts might have attempted to manipulate the guidelines to 
their own benefit, the court in 1973, required that boards of 
education make a determination of remediability and place it 
on record. In Waller v. Board of Education of Century 
Community Unit School District #100 it was required that: 
On appeal, a record could not be properly reviewed 
unless there was a showing that the Board made a 
determination regarding remediability of causes and unless 
its reasons are expressed in such a fashion that the 
reviewing court can pass judgment on them. 20 
This court felt it to be only reasonable that a record 
be maintained by the Board disclosing its findings regarding 
remediability, because the law itself21 stated that the 
Board's decision was subject to review. In further justifying 
its reasons for enjoining boards of education to record 
18Hauswald, 20 Ill. App.2d 49 (1958). 
19werner, 40 Ill. App.2d 491 (1963). 
2
°waller v. Board of Education of Century Community Unit 
District No. 100, 13 Ill. App.3d 1056, 302 N.E.2d 19 _(1973). 
21Id. 
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findings of remediability Waller, supra cited Donahoo in 
stating that: 
A board would not so readily dismiss when its reasons 
therefor will be submitted to the bar of public opinion. 
Such a statement would give the teacher a chance to know 
his weaknesses and try to correct. 22 
Because the school board in the Waller case failed to 
make any finding on record regarding remediability of the 
enumerated causes, the court felt that the board of education 
was not in accordance with the intent of the law. Therefore 
this action prejudiced the rights of the teacher. For this 
reason the action of the board was reversed. 
Illinois courts further ascertained in 1974, that it was 
the sole responsibility of the board of education to serve 
written notice of warning of causes which might become 
charges. A principal's letter of direction, as cited in the 
Everett decision, would not serve as warning. 23 
As remediability of cause continued to evolve judicially, 
more stringent guidelines continued to develop for dismissing 
a tenured teacher. Another such case was Glover v. Board of 
Education,~ in 1974. The appellate court in Glover added 
that 
If defects which are remedial in nature continue for 
a long enough period of time and where the teacher refuses 
~Donahoo, 413 Ill. 422 (1952). 
23Everett v. Board of Education of District 101, 22 Ill. 
App.3d 594, 317 N.E.2d 753 (1974). 
24Glover v. Board of Education, 2 Ill. App.3d 1053, 316 
N.E.2d 534 (1974). 
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or fails to remedy them, they have been considered 
irremedial. 
With the inclusion of the Jepsen, 25 Werner26 and 
Glover27 decisions, the following questions emerged to apply 
against a school board's decision to designate cause as 
irremediable: 
1. Was the dismissal in the best interests of the 
schools of the district? (Meredith--1955) 28 
2. Was the determination of irremediable cause 
arbitrary, malicious, or capricious in intent? 
(Meredith--1955)~ 
3. Did any of the causes inflict damage or injury to 
the school, students or faculty? (Jepsen-1958) 30 
and Werner--1963) 31 
4. Did the causes which were remediable in nature 
continue over a long period of time or did the 
teacher fail to remedy them? (Glover--1974) 32 
25Jepsen, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204 (1958). 
26werner, 40 Ill. App. 2d 49 (1958). 
27Glover 
' 
21 Ill. App. 3d 1053 (1974). 
28Mered i th, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1950). 
29Id. 
30Jepsen, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204 (1958). 
31Werner 
' 
40 Ill. App. 2d 49 (1958). 
32Glover 
' 
21 Ill. App. 3d 1053 (1974). 
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Gilliland33 , an Illinois Supreme Court decision in 1977 
[and later Aulworm34 in 1977 and Grissom35 in 1978] confirmed 
the aforementioned points in its holding with the following 
criterion for determining remediability: 36 
1. Did any of the causes damage the students, faculty 
or school? 
2. Could the conduct resulting in that damage have 
been corrected had the teacher's superiors warned 
him or her? 
3. Did the cause go uncorrected over a long period of 
time? Uncorrected causes for dismissal which were 
originally remediable in nature can become 
irremediable if continued over a long period of 
time. 
The Illinois Supreme Court in Gilliland, 37 stressed that 
although it is the responsibility of the board of education to 
determine irremediability of cause; the board's findings are 
not immune from judicial review. If after being applied to 
statutory and judicial criterion, a teacher's cause for 
33Gilliland, 62 Ill. App. 3d 143 ( 1977) . 
34Aulworm v. Board of Education of Murohvsboro Community 
Unit School District 186, 67 Ill.2d 434, 10 Ill. Dec. 571, 
N.E.2d 1337 (1977). 
35Grissom v. Board of Education of Buckley-Loda Community 
School District No. 8, 75 Ill.2d 314, 26 Ill. Dec. 683, 388 
N.E.2d 398 (1979). 
36Gilliland, 62 Ill. App. 3d 143 (1977). 
37Ibid. 
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dismissal was found by the court to be remediable; a board's 
findings would be against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
In turn the board would then have lacked jurisdiction to 
proceed with the dismissal, as the teacher was not given 
written warning to remediate and an opportunity for correction 
as stipulated by SEC. 24-12 of the Illinois School Code. 38 
Between 1962 and 1976, Illinois courts found lack of 
discipline to be remediable in nature. Such was the case in 
Wells v. Board of Education of Community School District No. 
22139 (1967), Yesinowski v. Board of Education of Bryon 
Community Unit School District No. 22640 (1975), and Paprocki 
v. Board of Education of McHenry Community High School 
District No. 156 (1975) 41 However in Gilliland42 , lack of 
discipline and control were found to be irremediable because 
discipline was combined with a number of causes and was 
continuous in nature. Gilliland's misconduct, which included 
incompetency, cruelty, and negligence; also damaged her 
students and the school itself. 
38ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1975). 
39Wells v. Board of Education of Community School District 
No. 221, 85 Ill. App.2d 312, 230 N.E.2d 6 (1967). 
40Yesinowski v. Board of Education of Byron Community 
School District No. 226, 28 Ill. App.3d 119, 328 N.E.2d 23 
(1975). 
41 Paprocki v. Board of Education of McHenry Community High 
School District 156, 31 Ill. App.3d 112, 334 N.E.2d 841 
(1975). 
42Gilliland, 67 Ill. App.3d 143 (1977). 
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Other causes in dismissal cases of tenured teachers 
which were held to be irremediable included a teacher's: 
1. Noncooperation with the staff and principal; 43 
2. Willful and intentional violation of a board's 
request not to attend a conference unrelated to the 
school curriculum; 44 
3. Uncontrollable temper outbursts over a period of 
two years ; 45 
4. Uncorrected lack of cooperation, disciplinary 
methods, etc. over an extended period of time; 46 
and 
5. Failure to follow a sabbatical leave plan for full-
time study. 47 
These dismissal cases shared some commonalities, which 
lead to causes being upheld by courts as irremediable. One 
such common factor was ample documentation by the board of 
education of warning notices sent regarding remediable defects 
in teaching and sufficient time to remedy said shortcomings. 
43Robinson v. Community Unit School District No. 7, 35 
Ill. App.2d 325, 182 N.E.2d 770 (1962). 
44Yuen v. Board of Education of School District No. U-46, 
77 Ill. App.2d 353, 222 N.E.2d 573 (1966). 
45Kallas v. Board of Education of Marshall Community Unit 
District No. C-2, 15 Ill. App.3d 450, 304 N.E.2d 527 (1973). 
46McLain v. Board of Education School District No. 52, 36 
Ill. App.2d 143, 183 N.E.2d 7 (1962). 
47Pittel v. Board of Education School District 111, 315 
N.E. 179 (1974). 
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Exemplifying this concept was McLain v. Board of Education, 
School District No. 52. 48 The appellate court in McLain ruled 
that repeated oral and written notifications over a period of 
months of teaching deficiencies and opportunity to remedy 
indicated compliance with statutory requirements. Under such 
circumstances it then became common for courts to rule those 
causes irremediable, when a teacher was repeatedly warned to 
correct teaching faults and failed to comply with directives. 
In Kallas v. Board of Education of Marshall Community Unit 
School District No. C-2, the court recognized that although 
temper outbursts were remediable; it did not entitle them to 
remain remediable forever. 49 
A third type of commonality leading to irremediability 
of cause were those which the court had decided were injurious 
to either the students, faculty, or school. A teacher's 
absence and intentional violation of a Board rule was held to 
be a loss to the students, in Yuen v. Board of Education of 
School District No. U-46, as damage was done and could not be 
remedied. 50 
As previously stated in the second chapter of this 
dissertation, that the provisions for remediability of cause 
in SEC. 24-12, only applied to teachers who had entered into 
contractual continued service. "Teacher" according to the 
48McLain, 36 Ill. App.2d 143 (1962). 
49Kallas, 15 Ill. App.3d 450 (1973). 
50Yuen, 7 7 I 11 . App . 2 d 3 5 3 ( 19 6 6) . 
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aforementioned section, was defined as any or all school 
district employees regularly required to be certified under 
laws relating to the certification of teachers. Further, in 
order for "teachers" to enter into tenure he or she must have 
been "employed for a probationary period of two school 
terms. 1151 
These terms did not succinctly specify that 
administrators were excluded and thus, not eligible for 
contractual continued service. Rather, the nature of the 
requirements in SEC. 24-12 for tenure were broad. Within the 
definition of "teacher," regularly certified employees could 
have included administrators such as superintendents or 
principals, in addition to teachers. Probationary service was 
not limited to time spent teaching. Instead this service was 
described as being "employed" for two school terms. 
Since tenure laws were initiated in Illinois in 1941, 
administrative eligibility for contractual continued service 
was judicially debated. In the case of Wilson v. Board of 
Education of School District No. 126, in 1946, 52 the 
petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to be reinstated as 
superintendent from the position of principal and to have paid 
to him his previous salary. Wilson based his claim upon the 
fact that because he had been employed as superintendent from 
July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 and July 1, 1942 to June 30, 
51 ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1989). 
52Wilson v. Board of Education of School District No. 
126, 3394 Ill. 197, 68 N.E.2d 257 (1946). 
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1943, he had fulfilled the requirements of contractual 
continued service. Thus, because the board of education did 
not abrogate his rights under the Teacher Tenure Law, he 
should have been reemployed for the next fiscal year as a 
superintendent. It was ruled by the Illinois Supreme Court 
that Wilson was ineligible to receive tenure, as he had not 
completed two calendar years of probationary service. However 
the issue of whether superintendents were within the statutory 
definition of "teacher," ~as not discussed. 
In 1956, the appellate court in McNely v. Board of 
Education held that a superintendent who did no teaching was 
still included within the provisions of the Teacher Tenure 
Law. Legislative policy regarding this decision was stated 
accordingly: 
It was the policy of the legislature to include within the 
Teacher Tenure Law only those employees required to be 
certified. It stated that policy by the simple method of 
defining teachers for the purposes of the act, as 'any or 
all school district employees' regularly required to be 
certified under laws relating to the certification of 
teachers • . . the certification of superintendents and 
public acquiescence therein, coupled with the later 
statutory enactment in conformity thereto, leaves us with 
the inevitable conclusion that superintendents are . . . 
'teachers' within the definition of the Teacher Tenure 
Law. 53 
Therefore, as relayed by this appellate court, the term 
"teacher" included superintendents, principals, supervisors, 
and teachers. All of the aforementioned were district 
employees regularly required to be certified under the laws 
53McNely v. Board of Education, 9 Ill.2d 143, 137 
N.E.2d 63 (1956). 
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and teachers . All of the aforementioned were district 
employees regularly required to be certified under the laws 
relating to the certification of teachers. 
Another appellate court decision in 1967 agreed with the 
McNely54 decision and further stated that superintendents only 
have tenure as a teacher. In Lester v. Board of Education of 
School District No. 119, 55 the question was not whether a 
superintendent was within the scope of the Tenure Act; but 
whether he had tenure as a superintendent. Justification for 
the ruling was based on the fact that superintendents were 
"teachers" according to tenure law and acquired tenure as a 
certified employee of the school. Because tenure law 
permitted boards of education to assign a teacher to a 
position the teacher was qualified to fill; a board was 
justified in this type of action as long as it wasn't in the 
nature of chicanery or subterfuge designed to subvert the 
provisions of the law. 
Six years after the Lestor decision, separate statutes 
were added to the state code which referred to principals and 
superintendents under a multi-year contract with a school 
district. These statutes, SECS. 10-23.8 and 10-23.8a,~ 
required that any principal or superintendent upon accepting 
55Lester v. Board of Education District No. 119, 230 
N.E.2d 893 (1967). 
56ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 10-23.8 and 23.8a (1977). 
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16. 57 
This action then left boards of education with two types 
of options for employment of principals or superintendents. 
With the first option, as outlined in SECS. 24-11 to 24-16, 58 
a principal or superintendent could sign yearly contracts and 
become eligible for contractual continued service as a 
teacher. If the district wished to dismiss a superintendent 
or principal, it would have to follow those afforded teacher 
under the tenure act. As stipulated by SEC. 24-11, 59 this 
status would not prohibit a school board from transferring a 
principal or superintendent to another position which the 
principal or superintendent was qualified to fill and to make 
such salary adjustments as the board deemed desirable. 
Additionally if salary adjustments were uniform or based upon 
some reasonable classification, notice and hearing of a 
reduction in status would be unnecessary. 
Sections 10-23.8 and 10-23.8a & b, offered the second 
option of employment of superintendents and principals for 
boards of education of public schools in Illinois. 
Superintendents or principals could be offered multi-year 
contracts of no less than three years, except for a person 
serving as superintendent for the first time in Illinois. In 
this case, a superintendent or principal could be offered a 
57Id. at Secs. 24-11 to 24-16 ( 1977) . 
ssid. 
59Id. 
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contract two years in length.~ superintendents, under the 
provision of SEC. 10-23. 8, could not be moved to another 
position. However principals, under the 1986 amendment of 
this same section, could be reclassified upon written notice 
and reasons. A private hearing could be requested by the 
principal. If unsatisfied with the results of the private 
hearing, a principal could also request a public hearing. If 
a board of education decided not to renew the contract of a 
superintendent or principal, it must have provided written 
. 
notice with reasons and a hearing. Notice must be given by 
April 1 of the year the contract expired; while a hearing must 
be provided ten days after the receipt of notice, upon a 
superintendent's or principal's request. 
The difference between the two options lies with 
procedures for nonrenewal. With a one-year contract under 
tenure law, it was less complicated not to rehire a 
superintendent or principal if he was tenured. Nonrenewal of 
a first-year probationary superintendent or principal only 
required notice, while the second-year probationary required 
notice and reasons. 
These procedures contrasted with those for 
superintendents or principals hired under a multi-year 
contract. Whenever a school board wished to nonrenew under 
these circumstances; notice, reasons, and hearing had to be 
accorded to the employee. In the author's opinion, it was 
60Id. at Secs. 10-23.8 and 12.23.8a (1975 & 1973). 
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actually easier and less costly for districts to hire on one-
year contracts, because it would give districts the options of 
bypassing the hearing process. However, as opposed to the 
strict judicial scrutiny of remediation of cause where new 
guidelines made it more difficult for boards to dismiss 
tenured teachers; this legislation favored boards of 
education. The two statutory provisions provided school 
boards with two possible alternatives, whereby the school 
district would choose the most beneficial. 
Tenure Statutes in Chicago: 1961-1975 
Although Chicago tenure law was legislated well before 
the rest of the state in 1917 61 , Chicago lagged behind 
downstate districts in other tenure developments. The 
original Teacher Tenure Act of 194162 for downstate teachers 
included provisions for remediability. It was amended to 
include administrative review in 194563 and the use of an 
impartial hearing officer in 1975.M Remediability of cause 
was legislated for Chicago in 1963, 65 while administrative 
review was added in 1963 and the impartial hearing office in 
61Id. at Sec. 161 (1917). 
62Id. at Sec. 136c (1941). 
63Id. at Sec. 136c (1945). 
Mra. at Sec. 24-12 (1975). 
65Id. at Sec. 34-85 (1963). 
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1979. 66 Additionally, Chicago administrators were not 
eligible for the provisions of the multi-year contract of 
SECS. 10-23.8 to 10-23.Sb.~ According to SEC. 34-85, 68 
principals in Chicago maintained eligibility for tenure as 
principals until 1989. Downstate principals under SEC. 24-
1269 were never conferred tenure as a principal. 
Aside from the delays in tenure legislation between 
Chicago and downstate districts, differences in wording of the 
aforementioned passages were minimal. Regarding remediability 
of cause, SEC. 24-12 (Downstate) read: 
Before setting a hearing on charges stemming from causes 
that are considered remediable, a board must give the 
teacher reasonable warning in writing, stating 
specificalltc the causes which if not removed, may result 
in charges . 0 
Whereas, SEC. 34-85 (Chicago) stipulated that: 
Before service of notice of charges on account of causes 
that may be deemed to be remediable, the teacher or 
principal shall be given reasonable warning in writing, 
stating specificallt the causes which, if not removed, may 
result in charges. 7 
The two passages vary in terms of when cause must be 
deemed remediable. It was further required upon downstate 
66Id. at Sec. 34-85 (1979). 
67Id. at Secs. 10-23.8 & Sa (1975 & 1973). 
68Id. at Sec. 34-85 (1979). 
69see Secs. 136c (1941) to 24-12 (1989). 
70Id. at Sec. 24-12 (1979). 
71Id. at Sec. 34-85 (1979). 
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districts through SEC. 24-12, 72 that this be done before 
setting a hearing. Scheduling a hearing date was hingent upon 
an approval by the board of education of a motion containing 
specific charges and a twenty day period where the teacher 
could request a hearing not be held. In holding a literal 
interpretation of this clause for downstate public school 
districts, a board of education then had up to twenty days 
after the approval of the motion containing the specific 
charges for dismissal; in which to determine remediability of 
cause. 
Remediability of cause under guidelines for dismissal of 
tenured Chicago teachers in SEC. 34-85, had to have been 
determined before service of notice of charges. Before 
serving notice of charges a motion had to be approved by the 
board of education; which contained written charges, 
specifications and a request to the State Board of Education 
to schedule a hearing. Written notice had to be sent to the 
teacher or principal no more than ten days after the adoption 
of such motion. Thus, the board of education had the period 
of teacher's tenured employment plus ten days, in which to 
determine remediability of cause. This meant in actuality 
that downstate districts had ten more days to deem cause as 
being remediable.n 
Al though there were many dismissal cases of tenured 
nid. at Sec. 24-12 (1979). 
nrd. at sec. 34-85 (1979). 
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teachers pertaining to remediability of cause from downstate 
public school districts between 1961 and 1975, petitions to 
the court on this same subject from dismissed Chicago teachers 
were virtually absent. Szkirpan v. Board of Education of the 
city of Chicago74 in 1975, was the only case to reach the 
appellate court. However it did not deal remediability, 
rather it was based on a supposed technical error on the part 
of the board. Other dismissal cases dealt with teachers of 
probationary status, who sought tenure. 75 
' 
Statutory differences regarding hearing officer 
legislation for dismissal of downstate and Chicago tenured 
teachers, were similar to those of remediability of cause. 
Variations in the law consisted of different procedural 
timelines. Section 24-12 (Downstate) designated that the 
district's school board set the hearing date no less than 
thirty and no more than sixty days after the approval of the 
motion of charges. 76 It further stated that the hearing 
officer make the final decision regarding dismissal with 
reasonable dispatch. As with remediability of cause the 
timelines required by SEC. 34-85n (Chicago) were more 
74Szkirpan v. Board of Education of the city of 
Chicago, 29 Ill. App.3d 1047, 331 N.E.2d (1975). 
~Thomas v. Board of Education of the Citv of Chicago, 
40 Ill. App.2d 308 (1963). Lipp v. Board of Education of 
the City of Chicago, 470 F.2d 802 (1972). Provus v. Board 
of Education, 11 Ill. App.3d 1058 (1973). 
76ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1979). 
nid. at Sec. 34-85 (1979). 
narrowly defined. 
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It indicated that the State Board of 
Education schedule a hearing (as opposed to the local school 
board in downstate districts) no less than twenty and no more 
than forty-five days after the date the State Board notified 
the involved parties of the selected hearing officer. As 
opposed to the hearing officer making the final decision with 
reasonable dispatch as required in SEC. 24-12, 78 the 
previously mentioned section specified that hearing officers 
make final decisions within forty-five days from the 
conclusion of the hearing as to whether the teacher or 
principal would be dismissed. Legislation regarding 
administrative review for the two district types were alike, 
as both were based on the Administrative Review Act of CH. 
110, SEC. 264, of the Illinois Revised Statutes. 
Content analysis indicated that although timelines 
varied, the wordings of teacher dismissal procedures for 
downstate and Chicago areas had a general likeness. Most 
interesting is the fact that teacher tenure law was legislated 
for Chicago public schools in the early 1900's. Yet other 
rights inherent to the dismissal process for teaches in 
contractual continued service in downstate areas, (such as 
remediation of cause or the impartial hearing officer) were 
amended for Chicago teachers at a much later date. Albeit 
that the writer does not have the answers as to why this has 
happened; an examination into the reasons for these 
roid. at Sec. 24-12 (1979). 
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occurrences could be another topic of future study. 
Constitutional Considerations: Property and 
Liberty Interests 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights apply only if 
one was deprived of "life, liberty, or property." In order 
for a public school teacher in Illinois to claim that there 
was a denial of due process in relation to job security, it 
must be shown that there was a deprivation of one of these 
rights. 
Two major U.S. Supreme Court cases, Board of Regents v. 
Roth79 and Perry v. Sindermann80 delivered rulings pertaining 
to liberty and property interests and teacher dismissal. In 
Board of Regents v. Roth, the supreme court defined these 
terms. It commented on property interests in the following 
manner: 
In 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person 
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for 
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to it . . . . Rather, they are created and 
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such 
as state law--rules or understandings that secure certain 
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits. 81 
Roth 82 __ , the teacher involved who was an assistant 
professor at a state university, was informed that he would 
79Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) . 
80sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
81Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
82Id. 
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not be rehired after his first year of employment. The court 
concluded that because he had no tenure rights to continued 
employment and there was no state statute or university policy 
that secured his interest in reemployment or created any 
legitimate claim to it, he did not have a property interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment sufficient to require 
his superiors to give him a hearing when they declined to 
renew his employment contract. The courts in Perry v. 
Sindermann, stated that other factors may influence the 
creation of "property interests" for teachers. 83 It 
prescribed that if the customary practices of the institution 
created a de facto tenure system, then a teacher would have a 
property interest in reemployment and would be entitled to due 
process protection prior to dismissal. When Miller v. School 
District No. 167, reached the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1973; it was held that as a matter of Illinois 
state law, a second-year probationary teacher claim of 
entitlement to his position was not a property interest. 84 
As a cross-reference see also, Shirck v. Thomas (1973), 
another federal court holding. This court decided that 
because Illinois statutes required that a second-year 
probationary teacher be given reasons for dismissal, it did 
83sindermann, 408 U. s. 593 ( 1972) . 
84Miller v. School District No. 167, 354 F. Supp. 922 
(1973). 
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not create a property interest. 85 An Illinois Supreme court 
decision in 1976, also ruled that an evaluation clause in a 
collective bargaining agreement, was not sufficient enough to 
create a property interest where a school district was 
required to hold a due process hearing for a non-tenured 
teacher upon dismissal. Thus, what was brought forth between 
the federal and state level, was that notice on non-renewal at 
the completion served upon a second-year probationary teacher 
does not constitute contractual entitlement to a further 
employment. Moreover, it does not give right to a due process 
hearing. 
Another constitutional issue upon which Roth expounded 
was that of 11 liberty. 11 In interpreting 11 liberty, 11 the Supreme 
Court stated that: 
Liberty is not merely freedom from bodily restraint 
but also the right of the individual to contract, to 
engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . . 
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing to him, notice and opportunity to be heard are 
essential. 86 
In Lipp v. Board of Education of City of Chicago87 a 
federal court case in 1972, it was recognized that "liberty" 
takes in two interests of a public employee: the protection 
of his good name, honor and integrity; and the protection of 
85shirck v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (1973). 
86Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
87Lipp v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 470 
F. 2d 802 (1972). 
his freedom to take advantage of other 
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employment 
opportunities. Illinois tenure law according to SEC. 24-12 
did not require a hearing be given to a second-year 
probationary teacher who was to be dismissed.M 
Nevertheless, if the cause for dismissal would deprive a non-
tenured teacher of a liberty right, a hearing would be 
constitutionally required. 
Summary 
Immediately preceding the initiation of tenure in 
downstate areas, legislative action tended to favor teachers 
by setting forth basic sets of guidelines regarding procedures 
involving dismissal. During the period between 1961 and 1975, 
this trend continued. Tenure issues of importance were those 
regarding the hearing officer, remediability of cause, and 
constitutional requirements of "liberty" and "property". 
Chapter Five will analyze statutory and case law in the 
area of dismissal of tenured teachers, between 1976 and 1989. 
Previous concepts, such as remediability and federal rights, 
will be further researched as well as those which pertain to 
the upcoming segment of time. 
MILL. REV. STAT. CH. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1975). 
CHAPTER 5 
TEACHER DISMISSAL AND THE REMEDIATION PROCESS -
THE CONSULTING TEACHER: 1976-1989 
Introduction 
This chapter concludes the author's analysis of 
statutory and case law of the dismissal of tenured teachers in 
public schools of Illinois. In the first thirty-four years 
after the Teacher Tenure Act1 was introduced, remediation of 
cause was the most litigated issue involving dismissal of 
tenured teachers. Until 1975, school boards not only made the 
initial judgment as to whether cause was remediable or 
irremediable, but also ascertained the final decision in the 
dismissal hearing. After 1975, a statutory amendment to the 
Illinois Revised Code removed the board's power to adjudicate 
dismissal hearings. This responsibility was then transferred 
to an impartial hearing officer appointed by the state. 
However, boards of education still had the authority to make 
the pre-hearing determination of remediability or 
irremediability. An Illinois Supreme court interpretation in 
Gilliland, supra in 1977, decided upon criteria which must be 
adhered to when specifying remediability of cause. Gilliland 
1Gilliland, 68 Ill.2d 143 (1977). 
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stipulated the following two-prong test for remediability: 
1. Did any of the causes damage the students, faculty, 
or school? 
2. Could the conduct resulting in that damage have 
been corrected had the teacher's superiors warned 
him or her?2 
Additionally, this decision also stated that uncorrected 
causes for dismissal which were originally remediable in 
nature; could become irremediable if continued over a long 
period of time. Gilliland did not define though, the length 
of this period of remediation. It was not until 1985, that 
the legislature standardized this timeframe, by specifying 
that remediation shall be one calendar year in length. 3 
This chapter will further discuss the issues of 
remediation and tenure legislation related to downstate school 
districts and Chicago from 1976 to 1989. Court decisions 
which generated from legislated tenure statutes during this 
time will also be analyzed. 
Tenure in Downstate Districts: 1976-1989 
Tenure's original purpose was to provide teachers with 
the right to an unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious dismissal 
by a school board. 4 In keeping with this intent, the Tenure 
Act was continuously amended to intervene in any possible 
arbitrary interpretations by boards of education. Early 
amendments to tenure law in the 1940s through the 1960s, 
3ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Art. 24A-5 (1985). 
4Id. 
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constituted clarifications to vague statutory passages. Later 
changes in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on additional criteria 
to prevent abuses of the law. In 1975, one such example of 
additional criteria was designating that an impartial hearing 
officer would be the responsible party for final decisions in 
dismissal hearings of tenured teachers. (Before 1975, boards 
of education were charged with that responsibility.) 
Another type of criteria was legislated on September 2 5, 
1985, thereby adding a requisite of a one-year remediation 
plan which, according to ART. 24A-5 of Illinois Revised 
Statutes, would be commenced and developed by the district 
thirty days after completion of an evaluation rating a teacher 
unsatisfactory. 5 The remediation plan was to be designed to 
correct deficiencies which were deemed remediable. 
Additionally, ART. 24A stipulated the following criteria: 
1. Three people were to participate in the remediation 
plan - the teacher rated unsatisfactory; a district 
administrator who met the requirements of ART. 24A-
3 ;6 and a consulting teacher. 7 
2. The duration of the remediation was to be for a 
period of one-year. 
3. Evaluation was to take place quarterly during the 
one-year period, conducted by the participating 
5Id. 
6Id. at Art. 24A-3, Par. F (1986). 
7Id. at Art. 24A-5 (1985). 
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administrator. (Unless an applicable collective 
bargaining agreement provided otherwise.) 
4. Consulting teachers could not evaluate the teacher 
undergoing remediation. A consul ting teacher's 
role was to participate in developing the 
remediation plan and to provide advice to the 
teacher rated "unsatisfactory" on how to improve 
teaching skills and successfully complete the 
remediation plan. Consulting teachers were 
precluded from testifying at dismissal hearings 
under SEC. 24-12, for teachers rated 
"unsatisfactory" with whom they advised. 8 
5. Any teacher who completed the one-year remediation 
plan with a "satisfactory" or better would be 
reinstated to a schedule of biennial evaluation. 
SEC. 24-12 added that: 
The hearing officer shall consider and give weight to all 
of the teacher's evaluations written pursuant to SEC. 24-
A. The hearing officer within reasonable dispatch, shall 
make a decision as to whether or not the teacher shall be 
dismissed and shall give a copy to both the teacher and 
the school board. 9 
As the legislation was not worded clearly in its intent, 
several questions could arise upon review. At issue might be: 
1. Whether ART. 24-A required school boards to 
"initiate" or develop a remediation program; 
8Id. at Art. 24-12 (1986). 
9Id. at Art. 24A-5 (1986). 
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2. Whether ART. 24-A stipulated that there can be a 
discharge of a teacher who had undergone 
remediation with the Board acting in only a 
ministerial capacity; 
3. Whether remediable causes for dismissal which had 
not been determined according to ART. 24-A through 
a district evaluation rating of unsatisfactory, 
need to be subject to a one-year remediation 
process; 
4. Whether a hearing provided by SEC. 24-12 was 
automatic under circumstances where a teacher had 
undergone remediation. 
Powell v. Board of Education of the City of Peoria, 
District 150 and Illinois state Board of Education, 10 an 
Illinois Appellate Court decision in 1989 addressed these 
first two issues in its opinion. As to whether ART. 24-A 
required school boards to "initiate" or develop a remediation 
program it held that "district administrators are permitted 
under the statute to develop the individual teacher's remedial 
plans under the overall supervision of the school board. 1111 
It was noted by this court that a 1989 amendment to ART. 24-5, 
PAR. F12 specifically permitted administrators to develop and 
10Powell v. Board of Education of the City of Peoria, 
District 150 and Illinois Board of Education, No. 3-89-0084 
(Ill. App.3d Sept. 23, 1989). 
11 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Art. 24-12 (1986). 
12Id. at Art. 24A-5 ( 1986) . 
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commence remediation plans. Prior to 1989, PAR. F stated that 
the district would be responsible for commencement and 
development of a remediation plan. 13 
Powell also addressed a second issue as to whether there 
can be a discharge of a teacher who has undergone remediation 
with the Board acting in only a ministerial capacity. 14 
Meaning, could a teacher be dismissed without the Board being 
directly involved in the teacher's termination of employment? 
It was held by the court that once a remediation program had 
been instituted by the administration, the local board had no 
more responsibility or control over firing or retention of the 
affected teacher. With the inclusion of the remediation 
process of ART. 24A in 1985, a new clause was amended to SEC. 
24-12 which required that a hearing officer was responsible 
for reviewing the teacher's evaluations written pursuant to 
ART. 24A and for deciding whether or not a teacher shall be 
dismissed. In its rationalization, the court stated that 
The new legislation reflected the legislature's 
intent to remove from the jurisdiction of local boards the 
ultimate responsibility on a termination decision 
followin~ remediation to a disinterested hearing 
officer. 
Al though the court in Powell, addressed two issues 
regarding the 1985 remediation legislation, to date it is the 
only court case litigated at the appellate level, and 
13Id. at Sec. 24-12 (1986). 
14Powell v. Board of Education. 
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therefore other issues have not yet been articulated. Other 
possible questions may arise due to the additional passages of 
1985 through 1989 regarding remediation. Unanswered would be 
the question of whether it was statutorily necessary to 
provide a one-year remediation plan for all causes deemed 
remediable. One possibility would be the occurrence of a 
teacher deficiency which was cited through observations, 
rather than evaluations. Accordingly the behavior was not 
deemed as unsatisfactory, but was categorized simply as cause 
for dismissal according to SEC. 10-22. 416 of the Illinois 
School Code. Thus, the prevailing question would be if the 
district in this type of situation was legally bound to the 
one-year remediation period before contemplating dismissal? 
Another remaining question pertains to the hearing. In 
one paragraph of SEC. 24-12 (1989), it stated that "No hearing 
upon the charges is required unless the teacher . • . requests 
in writing of the board that a hearing be scheduled • . . 1117 
On the other hand, the clause regarding remediability within 
SEC. 24-12 stated that the decision as to whether a teacher 
who had undergone remediation will be dismissed, would be 
decided by the hearing officer at the hearing. 18 (Also held 
by the Powell decision.) 19 From the author' s perspective, 
16ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, 10-22.4 (1986). 
17Id. at 24-12. 
18Id. 
19Powell v. Board of Education. 
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these two clauses conf 1 ict each other. However, no additional 
statutory or case law presently exists to address these 
issues. Only further judicial scrutiny or legislative 
amendments will provide clarification. 
Historically, Illinois frequently changed provisions 
within tenure law. Alterations to tenure law during its first 
forty-nine years of existence, occurred as a result of 
arbitrary dismissals or the potential for abuse in removing 
teachers. In 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court had voiced 
concern that "a procedure whereby a local board function as 
prosecutor, witness, judge, and jury was too susceptible to 
abuse." Gilliland as quoted in Board of Education of Valley 
View v. File in 1980, added that: 
Perhaps as a result of these concerns, SEC. 24-12 was 
amended by Public Act 79-561 in 1975. Under the provision 
of this act, the local school board's hearing functions 
were placed with an impartial hearing officer. 20 
Implementation of a standardized remediation period, was 
yet another means to remove the likelihood of prejudices 
within tenure law. Before 1985, remediation periods varied in 
length from a few months to a few years. Even with the 
proviso of consistent guidelines for a remediation period 
though, broad legal interpretations were invoked elsewhere 
within tenure law. Remediability of cause remained unclear 
and was exposed to arbitrariness due to a lack of statutory 
20Board of Education of Valley View Communitv Unit 
School District No. 365U v. File, 89 Ill. App.3d 11·32, 412 
N.E.2d 1030 (1980). 
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directives on the subject. A statutory definition of 
remediableness of cause has been absent from SEC. 24-1221 (at 
that time SEC. 136c) since tenure's inception, as the Act 
vested this consideration to boards of education. 
Gilliland22 did provide a two-prong test for remediability in 
a 1977 supreme court decision. Each prong has been legally 
debated at length however, by either school boards or the 
teacher to be dismissed. 
This debate was evidenced by the amount of case law 
generated in the area of remediability. Of the thirty-five 
dismissal cases which were analyzed regarding remediability 
from the period between 1976 to 1989, {The thirty-five cases 
represented Illinois appellate and supreme court decisions 
regarding dismissal of tenured teachers in downstate public 
school districts.) remediability was at issue in twenty-five. 
These twenty-five decisions reflected case law pertaining to 
teacher deficiencies in four areas: 
1. Mismanagement of classroom discipline or excessive 
disciplinary methods - Eleven cases; 23 
21 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c {1941). 
22Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 ( 1977) . 
23Board of Education of Minooka Community Consolidated 
School District No. 201 v. Ingels, 75 Ill. App.3d 335, 394 
N.E.2d 69 (1975). Board of Education of School District No. 
131 v. State Board of Education, 99 Ill.2d 111, 457 N.E. 2d 
435 (1983). Combs v. Board of Education of Avon Center 
School District No. 47, 498 N.E.2d 806 {1986). Fender v. 
School District No. 25, 37 Ill. App.3d 736, 347 N.E.2d 270 
{1976). Gilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 {1976). Grissom v. Board 
of Education of Buckley-Loda Community School District No. 
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2. Immorality - Six cases ; 24 
3. Illness - Five cases; 25 
4. General incompetency - Three cases; 26 
(There were forty-three cases in all analyzed. Eight cases27 
!!., 75 Ill.2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398 (1979). Lowe v. Board of 
Education of the City of Chicago, 76 Ill. App.3d 348, 395 
N.E.2d 59 (1979). Rolando v. School Directors of District 
No. 125, 44 Ill. App.3d 658, 358 N.E.2d 945 (1976). Stamper 
v. Board of Education of Elementary School District No. 143, 
141 Ill. App.3d 884, 491 N.E.2d 36 (198~). Swayne v. Board 
of Education of Rock Island School District No. 5, 45 Ill. 
App.3d 35, 358 N.E.2d 1364 (1977). Welch v. Board of 
Education Bement Community Unit School District No. 5, 45 
Ill. App.3d 35, 358 N.E.2d 1364 (1977). 
24Board of Education of Tonica Communi tv Hiqh School 
District No. 360 v. Sickley, 133 Ill. App.3d 921, 479 N.E.2d 
1142 ( 1985) • Eckmann v. Board of Education of Hawthorn 
School District, 636 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Fadler 
v. Illinois State Board of Education, 153 Ill. App.3d 1024 
(1987). McBroom v. Board of Education, Ill. App.3d 463, 494 
N.E.2d 1191 (1986). Morelli v. Board of Education, Pekin 
Community High School District No. 303, 42 Ill. App.3d 722, 
356 N.E.2d 438 (1976). Reinhardt v. Board of Education of 
Community Unit School District No. 11, 61 Ill.2d 101, 329 
N.E.2d 218 (1975). 
25Board of Education School District No. 151 v. 
Illinois State Board of Education, 154 Ill. App.3d 375 
(1987). DeBarnard v. State Board of Education, 123 Ill. 153 
(1988). Deoliveira v. State Board of Education, 158 Ill. 
App.3d 153 (1987). Friesel v. Board of Education of Medinah 
School District No. 11, 79 Ill. App.3d 460, 398 N.E.2d 637 
(1979). Gould v. Board of Education of Ashley Community 
Consolidated School District No. 15, 32 Ill. App. 3d 808, 
336 N.E.2d 69 (1975). 
26Board of Education, Niles 
District No. 219 v. Epstein, 72 Ill. 
114 ( 1979) • Aul worm, 67 Ill. 2d 434 
Ill.2d 143 (1977). 
Township High School 
App.3d 723, 391 N.E.2d 
(1977). Gilliland, 67 
27Board of Education of St. Charles Community Unit 
School District No. 303 v. Adelman, 97 Ill. App.3d 530, 423 
N. E. 2d 254 ( 1981) . Board of Education of School District 
No. 131 v. Illinois State Board of Education, 82 Ill.-App.3d 
820, 403 N. E. 2d 277 ( 1980) . Board of Education of Valley 
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entailed decisions based on technical errors on the part of 
either the school board of the hearing officer.) 
Poor classroom management or excessive disciplinary 
techniques represented the major area of concern to school 
boards. Thirty-one percent of the analyzed cases pertaining 
to remediability during this period involved dismissal under 
these circumstances. What was significant was the fact that 
the quantity of this type of dismissal case had increased 350 
percent, over those same type of dismissal cases litigated 
between 1961 and 1975. There were three discipline related 
cases appealed to the courts between 1961 and 1975, as opposed 
to eleven from 1976 to 1989. 
Cases in this category were either classified as 
behaviors where there constituted poor classroom management or 
excessive abuse of discipline. In appellate court cases in 
Illinois where a teacher was cited as overdisciplining his or 
her students it was held to be irremediable in nature when: 
1. The behavior displayed by the teacher exhibited 
continuing patterns of cruelty and violation in his 
View Community Unit School District No. 365U, 89 Ill. App.3d 
1132 {1980). Glover v. Board of Education of Macon 
Community Unit District No. 5, 62 Ill.2d 122, 340 N.E.2d 
(1976). Hansen v. Board of Education of School District No. 
65, 150 Ill. App.3d 979, 502 N.E.2d 467 (1986). Koerner v. 
Joppa Community High School District No. 21, 1453 Ill. 
App.3d 162, 492 N.E.2d 1017 (1986). Massoud v. Board of 
Education of Valley View Community District No. 365-U, 97 
Ill. App.3d 65, 422 N.E.2d 236 (1981). Neal v. Board of 
Education, School District No. 189, 56 Ill. App.3d, 371 
N.E.2d 869 (1978). 
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relationship with students; 28 
2. The punishment inflicted was so severe as to have 
been deemed unreasonable; 29 
3. No amount of warning given to the teacher could 
have remedied the damage done to the student. 30 
An Illinois Supreme Court decision on this subject in 
1983, Board of Education of School District 131 v. State Board 
of Education31 regarded a teacher who had taught seventeen 
years in the purported district without a blemish on his 
record. In the last six months of his career, the teacher 
Robert Slavin, had difficulty in controlling a few of his 
fourth-grade students. In the course of disciplining them he 
was at times, in the opinion of the school district in which 
he was employed, too rough in handling them. For example, he 
grabbed and shook one of his students leaving black and blue 
marks; while another encounter with a different student left 
scratches. In a separate occasion, a student was thrown on 
top of his desk hard enough to make the desktop fly up. This 
behavior was rendered as remediable. It was rationalized by 
the Illinois Supreme Court that: 
1. None of the students missed school or sought 
medical attention; 
28Fender, 37 Ill. App.3d 736 (1976). 
29Welch, 45 Ill. App.3d 35 (1977). 
30Id. 
31 Board of Education School District 131, 99 Ill.2d 111 
(1983). 
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2. Serious injury was not incurred to any students; 
3. The board of education failed to demonstrate that 
conduct could not have been corrected had the 
teacher been warned. 32 
In reaching its decision of remediability, the court 
applied the two-prong test of Gilliland. The first prong of 
this test posed the question of whether the conduct caused 
damage to the student, faculty, or school. In the case at 
bar, the court responded that the conduct did not 
significantly damage any of the students. None of the 
students missed school or sought medical attention as a result 
of the discipline administered by Slavin. Also as opposed to 
where the teacher's misconduct extended over four years in 
Gilliland, 33 Slavin never encountered difficulty with 
students during seventeen years of teaching until the last six 
weeks. This conclusion was similarly reached by the appellate 
court in 1979, in Board of Education of Minooka Community 
Consolidated School District No. 70 v. Ingels, when it was 
stated that: 
Except where aggravating circumstances are present, the 
proof of momentary lapses in discipline and order or a 
single day's lesson gone awry is not sufficient to show 
cause for dismissal of a tenure teacher. Yet where brief 
instances and isolated lapses occur repeatedly there 
emerges a pattern of behavior which, if deficient, will 
support the dismissal of a tenured teacher. 34 
This concept of continuing patterns of classroom 
DGilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 (1977). 
34Board of Education of Minooka Community Consolidated 
School District No. 70, 75 Ill. App.3d 335 (1975). 
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mismanagement and additionally, serious forms of abuse to 
students; were upheld as being irremediable in other course 
cases prior to the Slavin decision. In Fender35 in 1976, the 
behavior displayed by teacher continued over a period of 
several years. Fender's abuse of students was more severe 
than that of Slavin' s. One offense was that of Fender holding 
a student by her hair and slapping her face ten to thirteen 
times, causing the child's mouth to bleed. 
Rolando v. School District No. 125, in 1975, was also 
more serious. 36 Rolando used an electronic cattle prod to 
discipline unruly sixth-grade students. In Lowe v. Board of 
Education, (1979), the teacher beat the students within a 
curtain rod, an extension cord, and a club made out of balsa 
wood nailed together and wrapped with masking tape. 37 Welch 
v. Board of Education (1977), presented a situation where a 
teacher paddled a student a second time because the first 
didn't hurt. 38 The severity of the second paddling warranted 
that the child's mother bring him to the doctor. 
Gilliland' s 39 second part of the two-prong analysis 
asked whether the conduct could have been corrected had the 
~Fender, 37 Ill. App.3d 736 (1976). 
36Rolando, 44 Ill. App.3d 658 (1976). 
37Lowe, 76 Ill. App.3d 348 (1979). 
38welch, 45 Ill. App.3d 35 (1977). 
39Gilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 (1977). 
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teacher been warned. Again in "the Slavin case", 40 the court 
felt that although Slavin exercised poor judgment when 
instituting discipline it was nevertheless remediable and 
should have been called to his attention. Further, although 
the board of education had an expert witness that Slavin's 
behavior was irremediable in nature, the court felt that the 
board did not demonstrate that the conduct could have been 
corrected had the teacher been warned. 
Two important points generated from "the Slavin case" in 
Board of Education School District 131 v. State Board of 
Education41 in 1983, to use a measure of whether a discipline 
related deficiency was remediable or irremediable. One was 
the harm caused by the mode of discipline. It was considered 
slight and thus remediable, if there were no serious injuries 
to the students and if the student did not miss school or seek 
medical attention. Also, it was remediable if the behaviors 
were isolated incidences as opposed to continuous over a 
period of time. 
Discipline cases after "Slavin" held to this rule of 
thumb. In Swayne v. Board of Education of Rock Island No. 
41, 42 it was held remediable when a teacher had placed a boy 
inside a closet as punishment and later hit the same child in 
40Board of Education of School District 131, 99 Ill. 2d 
111 (1983). 
42swayne, 45 Ill. App.3d 35 (1977). 
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front of the class with a yardstick three times across the 
buttocks. Before being hit, the child was instructed to pull 
down his jeans and bend over and grab his ankles. His 
underwear remained on. Using "Slavin" as a baseline the court 
felt the offense to be less serious than that of "Slavin." In 
two other discipline related cases, 43 both in 1986, the 
teachers were given notice to remedy deficiencies before 
dismissal when their classroom discipline was unruly. 
Disciplinary mismanagement was only one possible type of 
. 
teacher incompetency. With other types of behaviors which 
could be labeled as "incompetency" the courts had held to the 
same tests as in Gilliland44 and in the "Slavin" case. The 
courts in particular looked at whether the cited deficiencies 
could have been corrected with warning. For example, in 
Aulworm v. Board of Education of Murphysboro, 45 the teacher's 
dismissal notice contained eight grounds for dismissal. Among 
these grounds were such charges as lack of preparation for 
teaching duties and failure to comply with stated policies of 
the Board of Education. In actuality these charges amounted 
to failure to submit lesson plans, attendance forms, and 
student recognition reports, not conducting a student musical, 
and inadequately performing his football-coaching duties. 
43combs, 498 N.E.2d 806 {1986). 
App.3d 884 {1986). 
44Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 ( 1977). 
45Aulworm, 67 Ill. 2d 434 ( 1977) . 
Stamper, 141 Ill. 
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However using the criteria from Gilliland, 46 the courts 
considered these behaviors as remediable as they could have 
been corrected with prior warning. 
Although there were many dismissal cases involving 
improper discipline, in other areas of incompetency there were 
few. Throughout the history of Illinois tenure, the courts 
have not come out with a definition of incompetence. Rather, 
they have dealt with the subject on a case-by-case basis. In 
each, the courts have ruled by judging according to uniqueness 
of facts and applicability to the Gilliland47 two-prong 
analysis for remediability. So perhaps, the test is not in 
whether a behavior should be proven as being incompetent, but 
rather did it qualify as first, not being against the manifest 
weight of the evidence and second, remediable under the 
guidelines of Gilliland. 48 
Also relevant to cases of incompetence was the time 
period over which the purported behaviors occurred. In cases 
where the deficiencies were continuous in nature, the court 
was more apt to hold the behavior to be irremediable. Well 
before Gilliland49 in 1962, the McLain decision had stated 
that • 
Even though separate items may appear remediable, when the 
46Gilliland, 67 Ill. App.2d 143 (1977). 
47Id. 
48rd. 
49Id. 
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teacher for more than a year repeatedly refuses to accept 
any recommendations and persists in her rigid ways, there 
must come a time when they can no longer be re~arded as 
remediable being apparently a character defect. 0 
Other than discipline related, there were few cases 
litigated in the upper court levels which dealt with 
incompetency. This phenomena could be reasoned to the courts 
reservation in specifying a true definition of incompetency. 
With only guidelines as to remediability provided by state 
statute at hand, the area of incompetency may have been viewed 
as vague as to what actually can constitute a basis for 
dismissal. 
As related by Donald Rosenburger and Richard Plimpton in 
the Journal of Education, 
Administrators are often unclear about the way in which 
courts will dismiss. They have had no experience in 
gathering pertinent evidence, presenting it, or defending 
a point of view in a court of law. Add this to public 
relations and staff relations, implications of making 
decisions on competence, and inaction is often the 
result. 51 
School districts would attempt under the guise of 
incompetency to dismiss teachers on illness related charges. 
However in 1975, it was amended into the Illinois Revised 
Statutes in SEC. 10-22.4 that "temporary mental or physical 
incapacity to perform teaching duties was not a cause for 
dismissal. 1152 However, SEC. 24-13 of the Illinois School 
5
°McLain, 36 Ill. App. 2d 143 (1962). 
5111 Teacher Incompetence and the Courts," Journal of Law 
and Education (July 1975): 470. 
52ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 10-22.4 (1975). 
112 
Code allowed a school board to define temporary illness and 
incapacity. 53 Section 24-13 also reiterated SEC. 10-22.4 in 
that a teacher's tenure "is not affected by absence caused by 
temporary illness or temporary incapacity as defined by 
regulations of the employing board. 1154 
According to the Appellate Court in Board of Education 
School District No. 151 v. Illinois State of Education55 in 
197, school boards could not define temporary illness or 
incapacity out of existence. A board of education's power to 
define was not absolute, rather it was limited by SEC. 10-
22. 456 of the School Code. 
Teachers also tried to use the temporary illness clause 
to their own advantage, as did boards of education. One 
teacher in 1987, 57 when it became apparent that she would be 
dismissed for deficiencies cited by the school board as 
incompetency, submitted a note from her doctor that she was on 
active medical treatment and needed time off. The board of 
education granted her sick leave, but still sought dismissal 
for incompetency. This decision, DeOl i veira v. State Board of 
~Id. at Sec. 24-13 (1975). 
54Id. 
55Board of Education School District No. 151, 154 Ill. 
App.3d 375 (1987). 
56ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 10-22.4 (1975). 
57DeOliveira, 158 Ill. App.3d 111 (1988). 
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Education, 58 was upheld by both the trial and appellate 
courts that the teacher failed to establish that she suffered 
from temporary mental incapacity during the remediation 
period; thus preventing her from substantially performing the 
tasks required of her. In another similar case in 1988, 
DeBarnard v. State Board of Education, 59 it was determined 
that a teacher had not proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that her depression prevented her from complying 
with the notice to remedy. 
Immorality was another cause for dismissal that was open 
to interpretation. In defining the nature of immorality, the 
courts looked toward the Gilliland60 test for remediability. 
A teacher in Fadler v. Illinois State Board of Education61 in 
1987, was dismissed by reason of immorality for squeezing the 
breast of a young girl and for placing his hand inside the 
undergarment of a nine-year old girl. In its holding, the 
court noted the following in regards to dismissal for 
immorality: 
1. The behavior could not be remedied by a simple 
written warning. 
2. The board is not required to wait until such 
conduct causes clinical adverse effects on students 
before finding the conduct immoral and 
irremediable, while other students may be subject 
to future abuse. 
59DeBarnard, 123 Ill. Dec. (1988). 
~Gilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 (1977). 
61 Fadler, 153 Ill. App.3d 1024 (1987). 
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3. Plaintiffs conduct was not only harmful to 
individual student-teachers relationships, but was 
equally harmful to the reputation of and faith in 
the faculty and school. 62 
With respect to the second part of the two-prong 
analysis of remediability in Gilliland, 63 the court felt that 
it was not an appropriate test to apply to situations 
involving alleged immoral conduct of a teacher. Contrary to 
the court's opinion, it could be argued that if a teacher was 
asked to refrain from improper touching that he would do so. 
However, the court in response, felt that a more appropriate 
focus was not whether the conduct could have been corrected by 
a warning, but rather the effects of the conduct on the child 
and the school could not be corrected. 
An earlier decision, McBroom v. Board of Education 
District 202~ (1986), also took the posture of the second 
prong of Gilliland65 being inappropriate to apply to cases 
where the teacher was to be dismissed for immorality. In the 
case at bar, the cause for dismissal related to criminal 
charges. It was alleged that a teacher stole a check from a 
student' s locker and cashed it. In the court's view it 
stated: 
If it only took a promise never to engage in the improper 
conduct again, it is clear that it would be very 
~Gilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 (1977). 
~McBroom, Ill. App.3d 463 {1986). 
MGilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 (1977). 
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difficult, if not impossible to satisfy the second prong 
of the remediability test.~ 
One type of charge regarding immorality which was 
problematic were pregnancies out of wedlock. The board of 
education in Reinhardt v. Board of Education of Alton 
Community Unit School District Number 1167 in 1975, charged 
that a teacher had become pregnant will unmarried and that she 
had falsely told her principal that she was pregnant. They 
also alleged that Reinhardt's conduct was a cause of notorious 
discussion and adverse public comment. It was unclear, 
however, to the Illinois Supreme Court what evidence was 
presented and what it was they may or may not have been 
contrary to the evidence. Because the court could not judge 
whether the findings were constitutionally proper, there could 
be no judicial review. It was to be noted that the trier of 
facts before administrative review in this case, was the board 
of education. Although it was tried at the Supreme Court 
level in 1975, the antecedents of the case began in 1972, 
before hearing officer legislation. 
In a more serious blunder by a board of education, a 
jury awarded $3.3 million to a teacher dismissed for similar 
reasons in 1986. Surrounding this case, Eckmann v. Board of 
Education of Hawthorn School District, 68 was the fact that 
~cBroom, Ill. App.3d 463 (1977). 
67Reinhardt, 61 Ill. 2d 101 (1975). 
68Eckmann, 636 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
116 
the teacher supposedly was raped by a hitchhiker while she was 
returning from a retreat from a convent. Also, Eckmann was a 
devout Catholic in a heavily Lutheran town. She did not 
report the rape to the police. Further, she was "counseled" 
by her principal who was also the superintendent (also a 
devout Catholic and opposed to abortion) that she had no cause 
to worry about loss of her effectiveness as a teacher. She 
gave birth in July, 1986 and then decided to raise her child 
as a single parent. Eckmann was fired the following January 
primarily on the ground of immorality. Testimony at the 
hearing consisted of doubts as to whether she was really 
raped. In part, the board's action was their response to an 
ad hoc group of parents urging Eckmann's dismissal. 
Eckmann appealed administratively claiming violation of 
her constitutionally protected rights. In a subsequent trial 
it was purported by the board of education, that Eckmann never 
really fit in. Again, the reasons were unclear to the court. 
As the trial progressed the Board added other charges not 
linked to her pregnancy dealing with events from six months to 
three years old. The court, regarded these charges as a "post 
hour smoke screen. 1169 
Eckmann' s rights were identified by the court as "a 
choice to conceive and raise her child out of wedlock without 
unwarranted state intrusion; 1170 thus invoking the doctrine of 
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privacy. Commentators on this issue have noted that school 
districts have had difficulty in promoting grounds of 
immorality because of an unwed pregnancy, 71 as it is a 
fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution. 72 As 
noted in Mount Healthy v. Doyle,~ a U.S. Supreme Court case, 
"once a conduct moves to the fundamental right status, a board 
must demonstrate a compelling need to dismiss the teacher. 1174 
A question to be raised is if such decisions should be 
insulated by protective fundamental right; thus depriving 
local school boards of the authority to dismiss unwed pregnant 
teachers. The answer to this question cannot be sought 
according to local values in school districts. Rather, it 
should be embodied in further judicial scrutiny. 
Tenure in Chicago: 1976-1989 
Although Chicago tenure statutes pertaining to 
remediability of cause, the hearing officer, etc. were amended 
into law after statutes of the same nature for downstate 
71See "Eckmann v. Board of Education of Hawthorn School 
District: Bad Management Makes Bad Law," Journal of Law and 
Education (Spring 1988): 281-297. 
72Amendment XIV of the U. s. Cons ti tut ion reads in part 
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the law." The right to bear children would be a liberty 
issue. 
~Mount Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
74Id. 
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areas, both Chicago and downstate public school districts were 
regulated by the one-year remediation clause in SEC. 24A-5 in 
1986.~ In 1989, as part of school reform legislation, the 
Chicago remediation period was changed from that of a one-year 
period to forty-five days. 76 This change could have been due 
to political pressures placed on legislators by lobbying 
through the Chicago Principal' s Association. At the time, the 
coalition of principals sought legal action because the reform 
legislation stripped principals of tenure and place them under 
' 
a three-year contract governed by each individual school 
council. Perhaps in a compromise agreement between 
legislators and the Chicago Principal Association, removal of 
tenure rights were traded for a shorter remediation period of 
unsatisfactory tenured teachers. 
Components other than the specified remediation period 
and the consulting teacher in Chicago tenure provisions of 
SECS. 34-84 and 34085 remained for the most part unchanged 
after 1977. Compulsory retirement at age seventy was removed 
from SEC. 34-84 in 1989, n as were any prior provisions 
relating to tenure rights of principals. Principals were 
placed under a three-year performance contract. Removal from 
this contract had to have been based on cause. 
Aside from the aforementioned changes to Chicago tenure 
~Ill. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Art. 24A-5 (1986). 
76Id. at Art. 24A-5 (1989). 
nid. at Sec. 34-84 (1989). 
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provisions, there were also additional changes to procedures 
regarding a hearing. In 1979, the school board was required 
by SEC. 34-8478 to notify the State Board of Education to 
schedule a hearing in it notion to dismiss. Hearing 
notification was changed for both downstate and Chicago in 
1988, 79 when it was amended that no hearing was required 
unless requested by the teacher within ten days after the 
receiving notice. Therefore, a hearing was not automatically 
scheduled. The burden of initiating a hearing now rested with 
the teacher. It was possible that a teacher may not request 
a hearing, thus benefitting both the school board and the 
state by eliminating the high cost associated with hearings. 
Emphasis on case law for dismissal of Chicago tenured 
teachers differed from those of the downstate areas in the 
years between 1976 and 1989. Of the cases litigated in 
Chicago over this thirteen year period, the following areas 
were noted: 
1. Procedural errors - Three cases80 
2. Dismissal or reassignment of principals Two 
78Id. at 1989. 
79Id. at Secs. 24-12 and 34-85 {1988). 
80Jones v. Hannon, 58 Ill. App.3d 504 {1978). Littin 
v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 72 Ill. App.3d 
889 {1979). Wolfe v. Board of Education of the Citv of 
Chicago, 171 Ill. App.3d 298, 324 N.E.2d 1177 (1988). 
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cases81 
3 . Remediableness of cause - Four cases82 
4 • Other reasons - Two cases83 
One fourth of the cases prosecuted dealt with the 
dismissal or reassignment of principals. Prior to 1989, 
principals in Chicago had tenure as principals, 84 where 
downstate principals had tenure as teachers only. (Unless 
they were under multiyear contracts.) Therefore, cases 
involving dismissal of principals tenured as principals; would 
exclusively be characteristic of Chicago. This meant that 
when the Chicago Board of Education sought dismissal of a 
principal (before 1989), the same procedural regulations were 
followed as those for teachers. 
Remediability of cause did play a role in the dismissal 
of both tenure teachers and principals after it was amended to 
SEC. 34-8585 on August 16, 1977. As with downstate cases 
81stutzman v. Board of Education, 171 Ill. App. 3d 670, 
525 N.E.2d 903 (1988). Mccutcheon v. Board of Education of 
the City of Chicago, 94 Ill. App.3d 993 (1981). 
82Chicago Board of Education v. Payne, 102 Ill. App. 3d 
741, 430 N.E.2d 903 (1988). Board of Education of the City 
of Chicago v. Illinois State Board of Education, 112 Ill. 
Dec. 236 (1987). Morris v. Board of Education of the City 
of Chicago, 96 Ill. App.3d 405 (1981). Lowe, 76 Ill. App.3d 
348 (1979). 
83Di Caprio v. Redmond, 38 Ill. App.3d 1031 (1976). 
Carrao v. Board of Education of the city of Chicago, 46 Ill. 
App.3d 33 (1977). 
84ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 34-84 (1988). 
~Id. at Sec. 34-85 (1977). 
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involving remediability of cause, Chicago was bound to the 
Gilliland86 two-prong analysis. Court decisions regarding 
remediability, such as Lowe v. Board of Education, 87 
paralleled those of downstate areas. General incompetency as 
in downstate areas, was difficult to prove as being 
irremediability. In both cases regarding incompetency, Morris 
v. Board of Education of the City of ChicagoM in 1989, and 
Board of Education v. Illinois state Board of Education89 in 
1987, they were held to be remediable. Where a teacher beat 
children with a curtain rod, an extension cord, and club made 
out of balsa wood nailed together and wrapped with masking 
tape in the Lowe90 case, cause was held as irremediable. 
Insubordination on the part of a principal in Mccutcheon v. 
Board of Education; 91 and possession of marijuana and later 
cocaine coupled with circumstances in which a teacher 
functioned unprofessionally in Board of Education v. Payne92 
constituted irremediable conduct. 
Although litigated before the 1977 amendment for 
86Gilliland, 67 Ill.2d 143 (1977). 
87Lowe, 76 Ill. App.3d 348 (1979). 
MMorris, 96 Ill. App.3d 405 (1981). 
89Board of Education of the city of Chicago, 112 Ill. 
Dec.236 (1987). 
90Lowe, 76 Ill. App.3d 348 (1979). 
91McCutcheon, 94 Ill. App. 3d 993 (1981). 
~Board of Education of the city of Chicago, 102 Ill. 
App.3d 993 (1981). 
122 
determination of remediableness of cause to SEC. 34-85, the 
court also upheld dismissal for a teacher's indecent liberty 
with a child while on vacation in Carrao v. Board of 
Education93 and insubordination in DiCaprio v. Board of 
Education. 94 
Other than cases involving disputes over the actual 
cause for dismissal, three cases involved alleged procedural 
errors. The appellate court reversed decisions in two cases 
where there were statutory violations on the part of the board 
and a third was reviewed because of inadequacies in 
plaintiff's counsel. 
summary 
A major issue litigated between 1976 and 1989 was 
whether a cause was remediable or irremediable. School boards 
before motioning to dismiss teachers for cause were required 
to determine if the cause was remediable in nature. 
Accordingly if remediable, the school board was to provide 
written notice to the teacher that if these causes were not 
corrected, that may result in charges for dismissal. 
Consistently, the courts in reaching decisions in cases 
involving remediableness of cause, reviewed data according to 
the standards set in Gilliland in 1977. As stated previously 
in this chapter, those elements from the Gilliland two-prong 
analysis included damage caused by the behavior to the 
93carrao, 46 Ill. App.2d 33 (1977). 
94DiCaprio, 38 Ill. App.3d 1031 (1976). 
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students, faculty, or school; and whether the behavior could 
have been corrected had the teacher been warned. In further 
analyzing cases involving remediableness of cause in the area 
of classroom management; the courts looked at the additional 
criteria as to the degree of damage caused by the teacher 
behavior to either the students, faculty. 
Past tenure statutes did not define the limitations of 
remedial cause, thus if was often broadly and favorably 
interpreted by local school boards. This in turn, resulted in 
an action where teachers sought administrative review of 
dismissals. These judicial reviews refined the parameters of 
remediableness of cause. As a whole remediation is still very 
broad in its intent and will require future litigations to 
further clarify its meaning. New case law will no doubt arise 
as a result more strict remediation provisions. Will 
statutory and case law continue to evolve where more rights 
are garnered for the teacher or will it emphasize a balance 
between the rights of the school versus the teacher? 
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The central focus of this research was the study of 
rights associated with dismissal for cause of tenured public 
school teachers in Illinois between 1941 and 1989. Tenure 
itself was initiated in Illinois in 1917 for Chicago teachers 
and 1941 for teachers in downstate school districts. In order 
to ascertain implications and effects upon dismissal of 
tenured teachers, both statutory and case law were examined as 
primary sources regarding teacher dismissal rights from 1900 
to 1989. case law analysis encompassed eighty-two Illinois 
court cases from the appellate and supreme court levels, and 
eight federal courts involving dismissal of tenured teachers 
in Illinois between 1900 to 1989. Secondary sources included 
legal periodicals, books, and dissertations. The purpose in 
researching primary and secondary sources was to: 
1. Examine and narrate the development of Illinois 
teacher employment statutes and 
2. Analyze the dismissal of tenured elementary and 
secondary teachers in public school districts 
throughout the state. 
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Through the use of content analysis, the study sought to 
answer the following research questions and accompanying 
variables: 
1. What was the legal statutory law history for 
dismissal of tenured teachers in elementary and 
secondary public schools of Illinois? 
- Criteria used for dismissing tenured teachers 
identified in the Illinois Revised Statutes from 
1941 to 1989. 
2. What was the legal case law history for dismissal 
of tenured teachers in elementary and secondary 
public schools of Illinois? 
- Types of teacher dismissal cases heard by Illinois 
courts between 1900 and 1989. 
- Grounds for dismissal cited by the school board. 
- Allegations, behaviors, and actions cited by the 
school board to establish grounds for dismissal. 
- Issues brought forward by the dismissed tenured 
teacher in appealing the school board's dismissal 
decision. 
Rationale given by the Illinois courts for 
reversals or affirmations of public school board 
decisions. 
3. What were the trends and issues for dismissal of 
tenured teachers in elementary and secondary public. 
schools in Illinois? 
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- Major elements that influenced changes in 
dismissal law for tenured teachers in Illinois 
public schools. 
Conclusions 
Numerous conclusions were drawn from the research 
regarding the rights of tenured teachers in Illinois from 
1941-1989. Following are those conclusions: 
1. Few employment rights regarding dismissal were 
afforded to downstate teachers in the early part of this 
century, from 1900 to 1940. 
Before the Teacher Tenure Act of 1941, no legal 
safeguards were embodied into the Illinois State Code which 
would have compelled school boards to offer teachers any form 
of due process, such as notice or hearing, before being 
discharged from a teaching position. Employment rights were 
limited to dismissal for cause and continued contracts. 
The Illinois Revised Statutes, 1882, vested boards of 
education, with the power to dismiss and remove teachers for 
specific cause. However, because there were no . statutory 
procedures to safeguard a fair dismissal until 1941, teachers 
were often discharged for capricious reasons. 
Continued contracts were incorporated into the context 
of employment legislation in the late twenties. Under this 
provision, a teacher could have been conferred a contract of 
up to three years after the teacher had taught two consecutive 
years of probationary service. Al though a continuing contract 
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allowed for a three-year contract, teachers were subject to 
possible political or arbitrary actions by school officials as 
there was no obligation on the part of the board to renew at 
the end of the contract period. 
2. After 1941, the trend in Illinois as a whole has 
been to legislate more strict criteria to safeguard the due 
process rights of teachers conferred with tenure. 
The Teacher Tenure Act of 1941, signaled the beginning 
of the trend toward instilling more employment rights for 
teachers at dismissal. It was provided through statutory 
amendments that teachers conferred with contractual continued 
service in downstate areas or appointed in the Chicago area 
were afforded the right to notice or dismissal, reasons, and 
a hearing. Later amendments required that the option for 
administrative review be made available (1945); an impartial 
hearing officer make the final decision regarding dismissal 
(1975); and that teachers undergo a one-year remediation 
period for remediable deficiencies rated as unsatisfactory 
before undergoing dismissal proceedings (1985). 
3. Tenure provisions for Chicago teachers evolved 
separately from tenure for downstate teachers. 
Tenure for Chicago teachers legislated in 1917. Other 
rights were enacted for Chicago teachers after their downstate 
counterparts. This has included provisions for: 
remediability of cause (1941 Downstate and 1963 for 
Chicago), administrative review (1945 - Downstate and 1963 for 
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Chicago), and impartial hearing officer (1975 - Downstate and 
1979 for Chicago) . Stipulations for a standardized 
remediation period of one year were amended for both Chicago 
and downstate areas in 1985. In 1989, the Chicago remediation 
period was changed from that of one-year to forty-five days. 
4. Before the tenure statute for downstate teachers was 
enacted, litigated dismissal cases in downstate areas for 1900 
through the 1930's, were mainly based on breach of contract in 
relation to a school board's interpretation of either "best 
interests" or "sufficient cause" for dismissal. 
Before the establishment of tenure law for downstate 
districts in Illinois in 1941, there was only one statutory 
guideline for school boards to follow when dismissing a 
teacher: That of vesting boards of education and boards of 
directors, through Illinois state statute, with the power to 
dismiss teachers for cause. 1 Most often school boards 
dismissed teachers for either "the interests of the school 
require i t 112 or for "sufficient cause. 113 As early as 1901, 
in Board of Education v. Stotlar, 4 it was recognized that a 
school board could have had capricious intentions in 
dismissing a teacher under the "best interests" clause. 
5. Once the legislature amended statutory guidelines 
1ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Secs. 115 and 127 (1900). 
2Id. 
3rd. 
4stotlar, 95 Ill. App. 250 (1901). 
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which offered downstate teachers employment rights at 
dismissal in 1941, 5 the cases heard before Illinois courts 
questioned interpretations as the statutes' intent was not 
always clear. 
Often the construction of passages in tenure legislation 
was not clear in meaning, leaving these statutes open to 
translation. Ultimately either a judicial review or 
additional legislative amendments clarified the intent of the 
statute. For example in the original Tenure Act, it was 
required that a teacher could be eligible for contractual 
continued service, upon serving two consecutive years of 
service. 6 "Year" was not defined. An Illinois Supreme Court 
decision in 1945,7 defined •year' to mean twelve months. 
Therefore, a teacher would have had to have served twenty-four 
months of probationary service, in order to be eligible for 
tenure. A 1949 amendment to the Act, changed the word "year" 
to "school term." Upon the 1949 amendment, a teacher would 
have then served probationary service according to the length 
of a school term. 
Tenure passages were not always subject to legislative 
refinement. The term 'remediable' has been the topic of many 
Illinois appellate and supreme court cases; but has never been 
delineated through the statutes. Likewise, dismissal for 
5ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 136c (1941). 
6Id. 
7Anderson, 390 Ill. 412 (1945). 
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'cause' (as specified in SEC. 34-85 for those teachers 
employed in Chicago8 has never been legislatively defined. 
6. The determination of whether a cause for dismissal 
was remediable or irremediable was a contended provision of 
the Illinois Teacher Tenure Act between 1941 and 1989, often 
subiect to judicial review. 
Since tenure's inception in 1941, remediability of cause 
has been a contended section. Although not overtly stated in 
the Tenure Act, it was implied that a school district must 
have first made the determination as to whether cause was 
remediable before recommending dismissal. 9 If cause was 
deemed remediable, the teacher must have first been served 
reasonable warning in writing to correct the cited 
deficiencies which could become charges for dismissal. 
Contrarily, if cause was cited as irremediable the board of 
education could have made a motion to dismiss the tenured 
teacher from employment. It was a discretionary power of the 
board of education to decide if a cause was remediable or 
irremediable. Quite logically, dismissal was more expedient 
if the school board acknowledged cause as irremediable. This 
point became all the more evident, when a 1985 amendment added 
a one-year remediation period. 10 
Although remediability was not defined in the statutes, 
8ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 34-85 (1917-1989). 
9Id. at Sec. 136c (1941). 
10Id. at Sec. 24-12 ( 1985) . 
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it was reviewed extensively in judicial venues. It was 
necessary that school districts study legal developments 
regarding the parameters of remediability, before deciding 
upon dismissing a teacher. 
7. Judicial interpretations of remediability evolved 
over a forty-eight year period. from a stance where a board of 
education was designated broad discretationary powers in 
making the determination of remediability, to a balance 
between protecting the rights of the teacher against the best 
interests of the school. 
The "guiding star" in the Meredith decision, 11 
philosophy was the judicial rule of thumb for court cases 
involving remediability of cause for dismissal from 1955 to 
1977. In this decision the court advanced adjucative 
authority to boards of education, by leaving remediability 
open to the board's interpretation of ·what constitutes the 
best interests of the school district. The only qualifier for 
judicial interference was if the board acted maliciously, 
capriciously, or arbitrarily. However, with the Gilliland12 
decision of 1977, this posture changed when criteria were 
developed to guide the examination of a school board's 
determination of irremediable cause. Gilliland directed 
application of a two-prong analysis for remediability. It 
first posed the question of whether the causes damaged the 
11Meredith, 7 Ill. App.2d 477 (1955). 
12Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 (1977). 
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students, faculty or school and second if the conduct 
resulting in that damage could have been corrected had the 
teacher's superior warned him or her? 13 This court decision 
took into consideration the needs of the school in the first 
prong of the analysis, without forsaking the rights of the 
teacher as evidenced in the second prong of the analysis. 
Further judicial review of remediability after 1977 
allowed for this same balance between the school and the 
teacher. Immorality was noted in Fadler v. Illinois State 
Board of Education14 in 1987, as being irremediable, with the 
comments that a board need not wait for adverse effects while 
other students may become subjected to future abuse. While in 
regards to excessive discipline the Illinois Supreme Court of 
Board of Education of School District 131 v. Illinois State 
Board of Education, 15 applied not only the criterion of 
Gilliland16 but also looked at the level of injury to the 
students. 
8. Major elements that influenced changes in statutory 
dismissal law were union lobbying. public opinion, and case 
law at both the local and federal levels. 
The primary thrust for tenure was through lobbying by 
14Fadler, 153 Ill. App.3d 1024 (1087). 
15Board of Education of School District 131, 82 Ill. 
Ap.3d 820 (1980). 
16Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 ( 1977) . 
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teacher's unions, first in Chicago and later in the downstate 
areas. To this date teacher's unions play a large role in the 
advances of teacher's rights in general. Not necessarily 
paralleling the viewpoints of teacher's unions, but definitely 
as influential as public opinion. Public tenets not only 
shape and mold the local political and legal arena, but 
nationally as well. 
Perhaps as a result of the interplay between the first 
two elements, the third which is the legal comes into effect. 
However within the legal sector, statutory law will generate 
case law and case law will generate changes in statutory law. 
Of the three, one element has not outranked the others 
in creating the most modifications in tenure law. Rather each 
has played a part in change, separately or together. 
9. Although most litigated dismissal cases dealt with 
either statutory interpretation or remediability of cause, the 
most currently cited cause within these cases was deficiencies 
based on incompetency. More often, the behavior and actions 
related to a type of classroom management. 
In cases which reached the appellate or supreme court 
level in Illinois between 1976 and 1989, thirty-one percent of 
the cases were based on incompetency as cause for dismissal. 
This amount was almost four times as many as those 
incompetency cases litigated at Illinois appellate and Supreme 
courts between 1961 to 1975. (Cases between 1941 and 1961 
were primarily related to statute interpretation.) National 
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opinions on education are such that schools are now being held 
more accountable for student achievement. Translating this to 
the local school level, there will be less tolerance for the 
incompetent teacher due to societal demands placed upon 
education. 
10. After 1941. cases were reversed when the cause was 
found to be remediable in nature of when a procedural error 
occurred in the course of the dismissal process. 
As previously stated, school districts were found to be 
without jurisdiction when a cause was found to be remediable, 
and decisions were apt to be reversed. With increasingly 
technical procedures in tenure law, more procedural errors are 
being made by school districts. Eleven cases between 1975 and 
1989 in Illinois were prosecuted over disputes where school 
boards were at fault over not adhering to guidelines, such as 
timelines, specific to tenure legislation. 
Policy Recommendations 
Analysis of primary and secondary sources, revealed that 
although many procedural regulations exist in Illinois 
statutes governing dismissal, school districts can 
successfully dismiss teachers without violating a teacher's 
substantive rights. Analysis revealed that appeals were most 
commonly based on cause being remediable in nature; or because 
statute-based provisions for dismissal were not adhered to by 
the board of education. In view of this, public school 
officials should be aware of the following considerations when 
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contemplating the dismissal of a tenured teacher. 
Statutory and Case Law Policy Regarding Remediability of Cause 
Since 1941, the Illinois Revised Code had required that: 
a school board must give the teacher reasonable warning in 
writing stating specifically the causes which, if not 
removed may result in charges; before setting charies 
stemming from causes that were considered remediable. 
If a cause for dismissal was later found to be remediable 
either by the hearing officer or the courts, the school 
board's recommendation to dismiss will be overturned. 
Remediable causes required specific statutory procedures. In 
their absence a school would be without jurisdiction to 
proceed with dismissal. Therefore, it is very critical that 
school districts first carefully decide that a cause is 
remediable or irremediable. In weighing this decision, they 
can be guided by the following considerations derived from 
Illinois Appellate and Supreme Court decisions: 
• Did any of the causes damage the students, faculty, 
or school? Could the conduct resulting in that 
damage have been corrected had the teacher's superiors 
warned him or her? (Gilliland v. Board of Education 
of Pleasant View Consolidated School District No. 
622). 18 
. Uncorrected causes for dismissal which were 
originally remediable in nature, could be irremediable 
17ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, Sec. 24-12 (1941). 
18Gilliland, 67 Ill. 2d 143 (1977). 
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if continued over a long period of time. (Gilliland 
vs Board of Education of Pleasant View Consolidated 
School District No. 622) . 19 
Certain causes were held as irremediable under the 
following conditions: 
. Excessive discipline when: 
- The behavior displayed by the teacher exhibited 
continuing patterns of cruelty and violated his 
relationship with students (Fender v. School 
District No. 25).~ 
- The punishment inflicted was so severe as to have 
been deemed unreasonable (Welch v. Board of 
Education Bement Community Unit School District 
No. 5). 21 
- No amount of warning given to the teacher could 
have remedied the damage done the students (Welch 
v. Board of Education Bement Community Unit School 
District No. 5).u 
. Immorality when: 
- The behavior could not be remedied by a simple 
written warning (Fadler v. Illinois State Board of 
19Id. 
~Fender, 79 Ill. App.3d 736 (1976). 
21Welch, 45 Ill. App. 3d 35 (1977). 
22Id. 
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Education) . 23 
- The conduct was not only harmful to the individual 
student-teacher relationships, but was equally 
harmful to the reputation of the faculty and school 
(Fadler v. Illinois State Board of Education) . 24 
Statutory Requirements for Dismissal 
Policy recommendations in this area can be summarized in 
one sentence. In order to prevent decision reversals due to 
procedural errors, boards of education should follow any 
mandated timelines and other procedural requirements in a 
timely fashion according to the letter of the law. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
In order to study dismissal of tenured teachers in 
Illinois, it was also necessary to study the elements of 
tenure. However due to the constraints of research it was not 
possible to study in depth the political aspects of tenure and 
dismissal legislation. A particular area of study could be 
employment legislation for Chicago Public Schools. Chicago 
has been, legislatively, an entity to itself. Regarding 
tenure, legal aspects for Chicago were very different from 
that of the downstate school districts. The political 
development of Chicago teacher employment provisions, 
including union influences, deserves a closer look. In order 
to more fully understand the history of tenure in Chicago, a 
23Fadler, 153 Ill. App.3d 1024 (1987). 
24rd. 
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comparison study may be made of Chicago and other large urban 
cities in the United States. Certainly worth comparing would 
be the dismissal policies of Illinois against states with 
similar characteristics. 
Incompetency seems to be an area of growing concern to 
school boards, as evidenced by the amount of dismissal cases 
where the cause was incompetency. To look for further trends 
one might research Illinois hearing officer decisions 
pertaining to dismissal of tenured teachers for incompetency. 
Immorality is another area where guidelines are being 
developed regarding dismissal. Of particular interest might 
be those with a constitutional overlay. What issues may 
evolve at the federal level and how might this affect future 
policy development of state statutes. 
In general, remediation of cause has made an impact on 
trends in case law in Illinois. A more in-depth analysis can 
be made of remediation taking into consideration the aftermath 
of the new remediation legislation in Illinois. Where is the 
balance of power moving in Illinois amongst teachers and 
school boards? Is the power of the school board waning? What 
are the trends and issues? 
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